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To Jonathan Arac, Paul Bove, and Donald Pease:
Brothers!
The separable meanings of each word . . . are here 
brought into one. And as they come together, as the 
reader’s mind finds cross-connection after cross-
connection between them, he seems, in becoming 
more aware of them, to be discovering not only 
Shakespeare’s meaning [in Venus and Adonis], but 
something which he, the reader, is himself making. 
His understanding of Shakespeare is sanctioned by 
his own activity in it. As Coleridge says: “You feel 
him to be a poet, inasmuch as for a time he has 
made you one—an active creative being.”
 —I. A. Richards, 
Coleridge on the Imagination (1934, 1960)

Brand X
I have always been in love with Brand X.
As a kid I’d see those commercials with
the brand name TV set right beside Brand X:
The crystal clear picture next to the snowy one—
which to me was really more starry—the way
it looks in your head after hitting your elbow.
Who’d ever want to buy a product like that?
Which is partially why I’ve loved Brand X.
But my father may have expressed the better
reason best : “Brand X lets you tinker with it”—
to repair, to improve—as though endlessly
customizing.
  But Zenith (the best set then)
once it went it went all at once—as with
a model atomic flash—nothing like Brand X:
Trying out both, we made the perverse choice.
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i  beGaN WORkiNG  on this book project some thirty years ago after 
noticing how the tropes and techniques intimately associated with mod-
ernism—irony, parody, unreliable point of view—while still present and 
active in certain “big” or important novels of the post-war period no 
longer determined the way to read them. The three “classics” or canon-
ical novels of this kind, all fictional memoirs—not just as it turns out—
are Doctor Faustus (1947), Lolita (1955), and Naked Lunch (1959), the 
subjects of my readings here. Two of these became iconic for post-war 
American culture, and the third definitively identified Nazism with the 
Devil. An old cultural icon resuscitated then, and two newly minted 
ones. Teaching and researching these novels, transformative of the idea 
of genius, of culture, of the literary, over this long period finally let me 
feel comfortable writing about them.
 Because I grew up during the time now-dubbed mid-century modern, 
my first idea, many offshoots of which still remain, was to focus on what 
the epigraphic poem of mine calls “Brand X culture.” Kitsch and classic 
merge to become all one incredibly vulgar pop culture that we like, 
perversely enough, because we can play with it and customize it to our 
liking. Certainly, the “progress” in this direction can be read in my selec-
tion of iconic texts, Naked Lunch being a collective product if ever there 
was one.
Preface
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 But there were those nagging questions of point of view, of irony, of 
parody, of pastiche, of modernism and postmodernism. And then it hit 
me: these three influential novels, the first a perfected model for how to 
do the great novel as a fictional memoir, the other two presenting new 
models of what counts as “normally” human as narrated by the excluded 
themselves, always sounded in their key moments entirely sincere. This 
is not to claim that there are no previous examples of such things. Fran-
kenstein and The Confessions of an Opium Eater come immediately to 
mind. But the latter, neither in its time nor in ours, became a widespread 
permanent cultural icon, and the former did so in our time only because 
of its film adaptations.
 The more I thought about my select group of novels, the more I 
focused on the culture of genius they instantiated and sought to revise. 
The other side of Brand X culture is the worship of genius, of the Zenith 
TV set over the Dumont. During the first half of the Cold War, for all the 
obvious historical reasons, U.S. culture aimed to produce geniuses in all 
fields. As the Nobel Prizes piled up for America, especially in literature—
Buck (1936), O’Neill (1938), Eliot (1948), Faulkner (1950), Hemmingway 
(1954), Steinbeck (1962)—writers competed to be recognized as a genius 
even as the idea lost its remaining intellectual substance in Brand X cul-
ture. So why, then, did the writers of the time choose to narrate the fic-
tional lives of such characters as a somewhat reluctant Satan worshipper 
(Adrian Leverkuhn) who deliberately contracts syphilis to force his dis-
eased brain into the state of genius; a psychopathic pedophilic kidnapper 
(Humbert Humbert), who claims that Lolita is a demonic nymphet and 
he himself is a hapless genius seduced by her; and a homicidal/suicidal-
gay-drug-addict-part-time detective (William Lee)? They did so because 
the international culture of genius they were hardwired by was turbo-
charged—to mix metaphors appropriately—by America (Mann lived in 
LA while composing Doctor Faustus) which celebrated and catered to 
genius, and they were driven to try to blow up that culture from within by 
including in their fictional memoirs the very kinds of characters America 
defined as aberrant and dangerous. Genius itself was aberrant and dan-
gerous, not to mention the tendencies and experiences they themselves 
may have known all too well. The cost of genius, if it exists, they knew by 
their rueful pursuit of it, was high.
 The theory of the great writer and the masterpiece, of the imagina-
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tive genius, that dominated the period is best summarized by Lionel 
Trilling, as I present it in the introductory first chapter. Essentially, it is 
that the great writer both in himself and in his masterpiece—yes, it is 
an all-male affair, I’m afraid—contain a greater portion, a more intense 
concentrate, of the culture’s oppositions and conflicts and represent them 
as such: the great Yes and the great No, of the writer’s historical moment. 
How the great writer or genius resolves or reconciles these conflicts and 
oppositions is in an imaginative dialectical synthesis, a kind of noblesse 
oblige on the part of the genius. In his masterpiece, he gives to us a per-
fected expression of usually tragic insight into the human condition via 
his identification with his less-than-adequate modern hero. Joyce is the 
model for this action, as Trilling sees it, but we certainly can think of 
many other examples. What better way for Mann, Nabokov, and Bur-
roughs to explode this culture of genius from within than to make their 
eloquently self-destructive “heroes” the criminally insane?
 But what about a positive view of genius to replace Trilling’s and the 
culture’s? For that, I have turned to Spinoza. Yes, I know: Spinoza? Really? 
I had read Spinoza first nearly fifty years ago in college, then again during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s when there was a Spinoza boomlet largely 
due to Deleuze’s influence, and recently in a reading group setting with 
colleagues and graduate students. I remembered this time around the 
great book by Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheistic Tradition 
(1969), which I read in graduate school. What struck me this time around 
with Spinoza was how much the Ethics, despite its geometrical method 
and rationalist goals, read like a romantic heterocosm, that would-be 
textual whole that is really a fragment of the literary system or absolute 
analyzed so well by Lacouthe-Labarthes and Nancy. It was Spinoza’s cos-
mology of the literary universe, as it were, except that Spinoza thought it 
was less a cosmology than an instance of the cosmos and its God at work 
that the Ethics proposes. But to me, a confirmed Nietzschean, every text 
is a would-be heterocosm, an other-world with its own “god” or genius 
permeated throughout it and the expression of the highest power-state 
known to the writer in question. Such being the case, then, every word of 
that textual world is meant as part of that world, especially as the idea of 
transcendence fades and that of immanence grows. Horizontal relations 
of all kinds replace vertical hierarchies with a vengeance, globally. Rather 
than each text, certainly each masterpiece, composing differences into 
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hierarchical structures of binary oppositions atop which sits the author-
figure projected by the text like a vision of the traditional creator-god 
over his world, we now have, as Spinoza puts apropos his metaphysics 
their identification, Deus sive Natura. All the distinctions existing in 
previous hierarchies reappear as versions of activity (Natura naturans) 
and passivity (Natura naturata) within an ever-spreading field of power, 
pleasure, and potential blessedness via greater knowledge of the field. 
However bizarre it may sound, I saw that the last two novels here espe-
cially instantiate such a vision, and the first novel, while closing down 
the last modernist vision of hierarchy, also opens up the new vista. The 
reason why I only begin putting Spinoza explicitly to work with Lolita 
and Naked Lunch, and not with Doctor Faustus, lies here. Whether we 
think of these texts as new stars in the firmament or as new black holes, 
there they are: to be read as best we can.
TO alaN SiNGeR for his continued support and critical powers of 
reading and to the other members of the Spinoza reading group, espe-
cially Phillip Mahoney and Michelle Martin, I express my profound grati-
tude. To my friends and boundary 2 colleagues to whom this book is 
dedicated I owe the best that is in me or my work: endless shared imagi-
nation.
 A different version of the second chapter has appeared in Soundings 
93, 1–2 (Spring/Summer 2010), 601–24.
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1DeRRiDa’S  ReCeNT  deconstructive version of genius is so much like 
his paradoxical theory of the gift (to be a gift it dare not seem to give) 
that it does not generally help illuminate any specific understanding of 
genius. His stress on its event character, however, does serve. In its long 
history, the idea of genius takes on many forms, but all of them testify 
to the sudden, unexpected manifestation of genius. This is so whether 
one means by the term the guardian spirit or daemon (daimon in Greek) 
attached to a person at birth and symbolized by one’s guiding star in 
astrology; or if one means a power or ability, a capacity beyond the ordi-
nary identified as one’s own and found in what we have produced or 
done. Sometimes, of course, one’s daemon or genius is not good but evil, 
not a special creation of God or the gods (like guardian angels or geni 
loci) but the soul of an illustrious dead man (usually) bent imperiously 
on working off his guilt or fulfilling unfulfilled designs via the person 
with whom the ghost shares a psyche—Hamlet’s father’s “Remember me” 
with a vengeance. Whatever the case may be, when genius bursts forth it 
realizes virtue in the old Renaissance sense, a power of invention and act 
that is swift and decisive whether in art or politics.1
The Culture of Genius 
at Mid-Century
Genius is a gift that never appears such, like what it gives.
    —Derrida
C h A P t e r  1
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 A key to understanding the secular culture of genius at mid-century 
is to recognize that there is a consensus about what in art, in literature 
especially, the imagination of the great writer does. Modernist and New 
Critical adaptations of Coleridge on the imagination and the action of 
the poet, ideally considered; or dialectical models derived from Marx 
or Hegel; or Freudian conceptions of creative daydreaming and subli-
mation—all demonstrate how mid-century intellectuals, particularly in 
the U.S., conceive of great writers as powerful or “first-rate minds” con-
taining, so as to incorporate in their works, the binary oppositions split-
ting and conflicting the culture. Lionel Trilling in “Reality in America” 
(an essay originally in two parts published in 1940 and 1946 and then 
revised for inclusion in The Liberal Imagination in 1950) lays out the 
consensus view of what the great writer, the genius, accomplishes via his 
work for a culture.2
A culture is not a flow, nor even a confluence; the form of its existence 
is struggle, or at least debate—it is nothing if not a dialectic. And in any 
culture there are likely to be certain artists who contain a large part of 
the dialectic within themselves, their meaning and power lying in their 
contradictions; they contain within themselves, it may be said, the very 
essence of the culture, and the sign of this is that they do not submit to 
serve the ends of any one ideological group or tendency. It is a signifi-
cant circumstance of American culture, and one which is susceptible of 
explanation, that an unusually large proportion of its notable writers in 
the nineteenth century were such repositories of the dialectic of their 
times—they contained both the yes and the no of their culture, and by 
that token they were prophetic of the future. (76)
Whether this containment policy model of genius echoes prophetically 
what becomes the geo-politics of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union after 
1947 is an interesting question to explore on another occasion. But what 
it does mean is that whether at the level of literary texture or structure, 
or in terms of psycho-biographical reading of the literary work, the great 
writer or genius internalizes in imaginative terms, pregnant with a future, 
the conflicts of the cultural moment. One-time fellow traveling social 
critics, New Critics, and psychoanalytic critics can all agree on this con-
tainment of conflict formulation of the culture of genius.
 One word missing from Trilling’s brilliant formulation, of course, is 
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“resolution.” How does—if he does—the great writer resolve or reconcile 
the conflicting oppositions marking the works of genius? The resolution 
that Trilling assumes in his readings for most of his representative critical 
career is not fully articulated until his 1967 commentary on Joyce’s “The 
Dead.”3
 Trilling agrees with commentators who read Gabriel Conroy as a pro-
totype for that particularly modern creature, the person with consider-
able imagination but little of the power of execution required to produce 
a work of genius, perhaps not even for mediocre work. Trilling, like Hugh 
Kenner, reads Joyce as filleting his protagonist with irony after irony, not 
the least of ironies being the final revelation that his wife, Greta, after 
whom he now lusts as they are bedding down for the night in a Dublin 
hotel room, is all the time thinking of young tubercular Michael Furey, 
her first lover, whom she still believes died for his love of her by standing 
outside her room and serenading her on a rainy night before she is to go 
away to convent school, now so many years ago.
 The conflict within the international class of modern intellectuals 
between the admiration and emulation of genius and its imaginative 
power of achievement is represented for Conroy by this crushing failure 
of his power to love Greta enough to overcome this ghost of the past. 
Yet, Trilling goes on to argue, against any finally ironic reading of “The 
Dead” and more in line with Richard Ellmann’s more positive biograph-
ical reading, that Joyce, in the last paragraphs of the story, particularly in 
the last paragraph, grants to Gabriel such a greater power of vision and 
poetic expression that it can only be a gift of his creator’s own genius.4
This sudden identification of the author with his character is one of 
the most striking and effective elements of the story. Joyce feels exactly 
what Conroy feels about the sadness of human life, its terrible nearness 
to death, and the waste that every life is; he directs no irony upon Con-
roy’s grief, but makes Conroy’s suffering his own, with no reservations 
whatever. At several points in the story he has clearly regarded Conroy’s 
language, or the tone of his thoughts, as banal, or vulgar, or sentimental. 
But as the story approaches its conclusion, it becomes impossible for 
us to know whose language we are hearing, Conroy’s or the author’s, 
or to know to whose tone of desperate sorrow we are responding. It is 
as if Joyce, secure in his genius and identity, were saying that under the 
aspect of the imagination of death and death-in-life there is no difference 
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between him and the mediocre, sentimental man of whom he has been 
writing. (117)
The liberal culture of genius entails for its maintenance that its great 
writers take upon themselves, contain within themselves, its strident con-
flicts, and in their works resolve them imaginatively, for a moment, by 
magnanimously granting to that culture’s most ironically representative 
men—mediocre, sentimental all—some measure of their creative power 
of language, as in such visions of the snow being “general all over Ire-
land,” which famously concludes “The Dead.”
Generous tears filled Gabriel’s eyes. He had never felt like that himself 
towards any woman, but he knew that such a feeling must be love. The 
tears gathered more thickly in his eyes and in the partial darkness he 
imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a dripping tree. 
Other forms were near. His soul had approached that region where dwell 
the vast hosts of the dead. He was conscious of, but could not apprehend, 
their wayward and flickering existence. His own identity was fading out 
into a grey impalpable world: the solid world itself, which these dead had 
one time reared and lived in, was dissolving and dwindling.
 A few light taps upon the pane made him turn to the window. It had 
begun to snow again. He watched sleepily the flakes, silver and dark, fall-
ing obliquely against the lamplight. The time had come for him to set out 
on his journey westward. Yes, the newspapers were right: snow was gen-
eral all over Ireland. It was falling on every part of the dark central plain, 
on the treeless hills, falling softly upon the Bog of Allen and, farther 
westward, softly falling into the dark mutinous Shannon waves. It was 
falling, too, upon every part of the lonely churchyard on the hill where 
Michael Furey lay buried. It lay thickly drifted on the crooked crosses 
and headstones, on the spears of the little gate, on the barren thorns. 
His soul swooned slowly as he heard the snow falling faintly through the 
universe and faintly falling, like the descent of their last end, upon all the 
living and the dead.5
Coleridge’s vision of the imagination and of the poet’s ideal activity are 
evoked for the mid-century modern critic by Trilling’s reading of this 
vision, as is Saint Paul’s vision of Jesus reconciling the conflicts of life via 
his sacrificial act of salvation. And the demand that the great writer put 
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his genius to work in just this fashion, incorporating and containing all 
conflicts—between the ideal and the real, the general and the particular, 
the universal and the individual, passion and reason, the creative elite 
and those leading lives of quiet desperation, and so on—means that the 
genius is also a saint, suffering these conflicts by containing and resolving 
them as here envisioned.
 This vision of the creative imagination working at full tilt always 
reminds me of the scene in Rebel without a Cause (1955) when James 
Dean, in response to his parents’ bickering in the police station over his 
latest infraction of the law, screams at them, “You are tearing me apart!” 
Trilling’s severe demand, placed upon the would-be great writer or artist, 
can only lead in the final analysis to forms of crack-up all too familiar to 
us from post-Romantic literary history generally and American literary 
history in particular. Whether we think of the long tradition of the poète 
maudit or its more recent “lost generation” or “Jazz Age” versions, or look 
forward to prime examples from the Beat or Countercultural generations, 
we see the evident consequences of aspiring to genius within this cultural 
moment. The best minds of generation after generation are lost to their 
“madness.”
 Moreover, when the conflicts that the genius is to represent and imagi-
natively express in an ideal form of reconciliation or resolution, predictive 
of the future, are totally intractable, so that the culture itself can fairly be 
judged to be “mad,” it is expected that its supposedly more-than-human, 
or daemonically imaginative, artists may not just expire in the attempt 
to write but turn positively daemonic themselves, not only increasingly 
against the culture but against themselves in their failures to measure up. 
Loathing of their culture and of themselves becomes the double-bind 
legacy of this mid-century modern vision of the imaginative genius.
 The most important unintended consequence of this consensus vision 
of magnanimously ironic containments of conflict for the culture of 
genius is that despite the warnings, perhaps because of them, of such 
novels as Doctor Faustus about the dubious ideal of genius and its mad 
breakthroughs at all cost, whether on the individual or national level, 
the bitterly self-loathing would-be geniuses emerging at this time could 
readily identify with those aspects of themselves that made them, from 
the established point of view, unfit to be representative of so-called 
normal society. The supposedly psychopathic pedophile, the gay and 
apparently homicidal dope-fiend, like the musical genius making a deal 
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with the devil himself, can become the new sublime figures of imagi-
native power regardless of whether they serve any discernible propheti-
cally representative or creatively expressive cultural purposes or not. Of 
course, such purposes can always be discovered if the critic works hard 
enough. Lolita and Naked Lunch most readily lent themselves to liberal 
campaigns at the time to expand the range of acceptable representations 
of sexual matters. My readings of them, however, focus on the theory of 
the imagination that is not a version of that dominating the period. Nor 
is it one that I have seen discussed subsequently. What follows is a theory 
elaborated out of these works and consolidated by my reading of Spinoza.
 Why Spinoza? His is the most radical theory of immanence ever. 
There is no principle of transcendence anywhere in the system of his 
Ethics.6 Spinoza’s conatus provides the key: only that which enhances our 
powers and capacities to persist in existence is good; all else is evil. Such 
spontaneous expression is a singular act. It is, I would argue, genius; all 
else is external determination alien to our natures. Conatus, the striving 
for existence and its singular persistence in any instance, is perfected in 
the self-work appropriate to each form of being. Just as every being is 
the actualization of Nature or God, so too every self-work as a text is the 
actualization of a singular conatus in its creation of a world.
 God is our model here. He is absolutely free as the perfect expression 
of all his attributes in all their modes in the world or Nature: he is pure 
act and is not really—only analytically—distinguishable from his power 
in action. Our intellectual love of God, the highest form of creativity, 
is our emulation of such freedom in our lives, seeking to express what 
arises spontaneously from within ourselves and to defend against what 
would limit us from doing so. This democratic sense of genius as absolute 
expression available potentially to all replaces the Trilling sense of repre-
sentative man and his self-sacrificing noblesse oblige.
 Spinoza’s Ethics is an instance of what it enunciates. It isn’t a represen-
tation but an expression. It is what it performs, an instance of its vision. 
The immanence of God in Nature so that Deus sive Natura is its motto is 
itself performed by the author’s immanence in the text. The self-work is 
what this book or this world is for the respective agencies that are their 
acts of expression. The name of author or of God is the name of the state 
of creation in these cases. It is the fullest, highest, most blessed state of 
joy or pleasure in power in action.
 We can have sensuous knowledge of a text that is impressionistic at 
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worst, incomplete at best; we can understand its context and composi-
tional elements, which is better; but we intuit the principles of its for-
mation into the whole that it is. Genre and convention, like reference, 
remain at the level of imagination and understanding but do not reach 
into the region where the existence, the conatus of the self-work, forms 
itself and acts.
 The self-work is God in miniature, an infinite of a scope different from 
that of God or Nature as a whole but still an infinite. We can know it only 
finitely, even when we intuit its principle of formation, because we cannot 
know or execute all its modes of actualization. If God is the Genius of his 
self-work named Nature (or World), then the author is the genius of the 
self-work of the text. In fact, the composite neologism “self-world-work” 
would best express what is at stake. The self-work is the repeated creation 
of the world.
 Of course, the history of contemporary criticism and theory since 
mid-century is one in which the author is said to die into the text. But 
my theory assumes that this recent development has been the case from 
the beginning—there never was transcendence, only immanence. The 
author is each word in its place in the text. Like God—or Nature—with 
infinite attributes and modes, the author is the text and all that it sum-
mons forth.
 What this would mean for the ending of “The Dead” is that Trilling 
unnecessarily manufactures distinctions. The imaginative power of lan-
guage extended throughout the body of the text condenses itself into 
what is comparatively a visionary focal point to conclude, bringing beau-
tifully together the story’s major themes in ever-softening crescendo, like 
the perversely sublime conclusion of “A Day in the Life.” We can name 
this power of expression Joyce or Joyce via Gabriel or the genius of the 
text—or simply God:
The mind’s intellectual love toward God is the love of God wherewith God 
loves himself not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explicated 
through the essence of the human mind considered under a form of eternity. 
That is, the mind’s intellectual love toward God is part of the infinite love 
wherewith God loves himself. (157, original italics)
Unlike the Lacanian Big Other of the Symbolic Order, Spinoza’s God is 
more like that of some schizophrenics, a power of inflowing energies 
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apparently without cessation. Acts of power. There is no internal screen. 
Such a God (or Nature) is more like Freud’s Id than like Trilling’s hero-
ically self-sacrificing, magnanimously noble genius. These two models of 
sublime imagination define the parameters of mid-century modern cul-
ture, whether we think of Jackson Pollock or Leonard Bernstein.
 Spinoza in the Ethics produces a modern philosophical heterocosm 
that purports to be a model of the cosmos and God’s workings in (and 
as) it. Spinoza replaces the distinction between God and Nature with 
their equivalence, Deus sive Natura. The geometrical method of argument 
in the Ethics is an instance and demonstration of how the causal neces-
sity works in the universe. The one substance that is Deus sive Natura 
possesses the attributes of both thought and extension in infinite and 
finite modes, or ways of being. The intellectual love of God is blessedness 
because it leads to the fullest and highest kind of knowledge and so the 
greatest mode of power possible for humans. With such knowledge of the 
laws of Nature and of God (they are of course the same) we can create 
the conditions that can give us the maximum opportunity to determine 
our actions solely from internal causes, rather than suffer via our pas-
sions from external causes.
 There are several major questions debated by commentators: Is Spino-
za’s position tantamount to pantheism or atheism? What are the specific 
relationships among the attributes, and possibly other attributes unknow-
able by us, modes (infinite and finite), and individual beings? Does the 
immanence of Spinoza’s position make for a night in which all cows are 
black, as Hegel charges, repeating his satire of Schelling against Spinoza? 
Why is immanence a good thing, transcendence not? My concern is not 
for any of these questions. The theory of genius, of the creative imagi-
nation, which I am advocating sees Spinoza’s philosophical system as a 
template for the kind of heterocosmic imagination that operates in the 
works of mid-century fictional memoir read here. I will argue in a sub-
sequent book for such a theory as being the best guide to reading the 
central Romantic and post-Romantic texts from Blake, Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, Freud and Mann, to the present moment.
 What I am claiming and hopefully demonstrating here is that the 
modern works that achieve canonical status do so because they are new 
models of literature productive of more literature to come. The analogy 
would be with new cosmologies, except that to fit my meaning more pre-
cisely the latter would have to be new cosmoses too. The closer to being 
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sui generis, the greater the work. What we read as allusion, irony, parody, 
pastiche, and so on, is part of our horizon of critical understanding, but 
the works themselves are entirely sincere and univocal in their construc-
tion of their models of literature, making use of whatever is lying around 
the cultural yard. We do best to read such works literally. Of course, the 
burden of the book to follow is to make good on these admittedly pro-
vocative claims.
 A few words in conclusion about the selection of works: Doctor 
Faustus captures the late modernist turn as it emerges into a postmod-
ernism we are now very familiar with. The final twist in the novel occurs 
when the reader realizes that the humanist narrator, Serenus Zeitblum, 
may be as much of a devil’s disciple as Adrian Luverkuhn, the sublime 
musical genius, and yet Mann is entirely sincere about his vision of a 
hope beyond hopelessness for Germany, for Europe, and for the modern 
world as a whole. For the reader treads on new ground different from 
that of the ironic, self-defeating allegories of modern fiction that repeat 
in a finer, albeit self-reflexive, tone, the models of literature derived from 
myth and traditional culture à la The Waste Land and Ulysses. Although 
producing no new model of literature, Doctor Faustus does close down 
the old modernist one, and prepares the opening for what is to come.
 Both Lolita and Naked Lunch achieve iconic cultural status generally 
and are best read in light of what the theory of genius out of Spinoza that 
I propose can illuminate. Or so it is what the rest of the book would hope 
to show.
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THe F iRST TiMe I discussed Thomas Mann’s 1947 novel Doctor Faustus: 
The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkuhn As Told by a Friend 
was in the early 1980s.1 The occasion was an annual special session at 
the Modern Language Convention entitled “Defining Modernism.” 
My memory of the details of panel membership is a bit vaguer than I 
would like, but I believe that I, along with Paul Bove and Jonathan Arac, 
boundary 2 colleagues, were panelists, as was Professor Stanley Corngold, 
a Germanist and an expert on Mann and Kafka from Princeton. I was 
interested in Doctor Faustus because I wanted to understand why and 
how irony transforms itself into parody, a general literary phenomenon 
Of love and Death
in Modern Culture
Rereading Doctor Faustus with Freud in Mind
For Paul A. Bove
From the depths of dark solitude. From
The eternal abode in my holiness,
Hidden set apart in my stern counsels
Reserv’d for the days of futurity,
I have sought with a joy without pain
For a solid without fluctuation
Why will you die O Eternals?
Why live in unquenchable burnings?
    —William Blake, The Book of Urizen, Ch. II, St. 4
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in the last century, which some more famous critics then were beginning 
to say marked the defining difference between modernism and postmod-
ernism.2
 I believed that I could clearly see this revisionary process at work in 
the novel, in part thanks to R. P. Blackmur’s chapter on it in Eleven Essays 
in the European Novel, a text Paul Bove originally suggested to me.3 Mann 
referred to this revisionary process under the heading of “erotic irony” in 
his Story of a Novel: The Genius of Doctor Faustus, which is made out of 
sections from his diary about the composition of the novel. Also the then 
just-translated 1918 text by Mann, Reflections of a Non-Political Man, 
with an entire chapter devoted to “erotic irony,” also supported this view.4 
Mann first deployed this term here in the earlier text Reflections and then 
developed, revised, and put it into masterful play in Faustus, commenting 
on it as well in those selective diary entries compiled and revised after-
wards in Story of a Novel. This over-determined circling around the 
topic caught my eye. Specifically, I saw in erotic irony the weight of the 
powerful drive that transformed a measured self-irony into an infinite-
seeming self-parody.5 In short, I thought I could use “erotic irony” to give 
a convincing account of why twentieth-century literary culture, as rep-
resented so effectively by Mann’s mid-century masterpiece, turned ever 
more relentlessly, self-destructively, even demonically against itself. This 
was the substance of my talk, entitled “The Self-Destructive Imagination 
in Doctor Faustus.”
 The arguments of the other session presentations are now a blur, of 
course, but the question period, at least its beginning, is etched in my 
mind like an Albrecht Dürer engraving of Death. For after we spoke, the 
first question came from a surprise guest, Edward W. Said, who given 
the time-frame must have been at work on Faustus for his book of a few 
years hence, Musical Elaborations.6 In any event, The Worldly Critic Him-
self now rose to ask what he called “a simple, even a naive question” of us 
all. “Why, when discussing Doctor Faustus, a novel Adorno helps make 
centrally about Schoenberg’s twelve-tone musical system,” Said inquired, 
“did none of you even mention music?” Imagine not a note about con-
trapuntal glissando from any of us would-be critical emperors of irony, 
parody, modernism and postmodernism, or whatever, who now stood 
exposed, before an overflow crowd, for the bunch of naked asses we then 
rightly appeared to be. Not one of us, I also remember all too well, could 
offer any satisfactory answer.
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 Thus, my current discussion is my belated answer to Said, twenty-
seven years after the fact. By the way, in case you are wondering, I will 
discuss music, but only briefly, at the end of the chapter.7 Even today, I 
still do not think the novel is really about modern music, despite half of 
the latest German edition’s 741 pages being devoted to it. Instead, it is 
about loving genius and its tragic cost.8
 With that, since this novel may not be that familiar, I provide the 
description of Doctor Faustus on the back of the latest English translation.
Thomas Mann’s last great novel, first published in 1947 and now newly 
rendered into English by acclaimed translator John E. Woods, is a mod-
ern reworking of the Faust legend, in which Germany sells its soul to the 
Devil. Mann’s protagonist, the composer Adrian Leverkuhn, is the flower 
of German culture, a brilliant, isolated, overreaching figure, his radical 
new music a breakneck game played by art at the very edge of impos-
sibility. In return, for twenty-four years of unparalleled musical accom-
plishment, he bargains away his soul—and the ability to love his fellow 
man. Leverkuhn’s life story is a brilliant allegory of the rise of the Third 
Reich, of Germany’s renunciation of its own humanity and its embrace 
of ambition and nihilism. It is also Mann’s most profound meditation 
on the German genius—both national and individual—and the terrible 
responsibilities of the truly great artist.
What a simple story—and so sensational—in its old-fashioned way! But 
somewhat inaccurate. Like many commentators, even Said in Musical 
Elaborations, there is no mention of how the story is told—“As Told by a 
Friend.” And as told by Serenus Zeitblom (Serene Time-Bloom or Time-
Bloom, as I prefer), the philologist and self-described pedagogue, the 
parallels between the rise of the Third Reich and the career of Leverkuhn 
remain just that, parallels with important differences between them.
 First of all, Zeitblom fears throughout the novel that his friend’s works, 
condemned by the Nazis, will never see the light of day no matter which 
side wins World War II. This is the period during most of which the 
novel is fictionally and actually composed. Wagner is more their speed 
than Leverkuhn, and Cole Porter more the Allies’ cup of tea. Second, we 
never see Germany make a bargain with the Devil, not even “symboli-
cally” by accepting Hitler. What we do see, through his own words in a 
letter, is Adrian make such a deal. Leverkuhn’s productive life ends with 
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his madness, in 1930, three years before Hitler and his goons take over 
Germany. I do agree that ambition and nihilism play their roles, but even 
more so does the tangled web of love and genius. Lastly, however, just 
to mention the big point this blurb gets wrong, Doctor Faustus is not an 
allegory, brilliant or otherwise; it is a strangely inverted tragic novel, the 
last of the modernist novels and the first of the postmodernist kind. I 
will explain why I say this shortly, but first my necessary explanation of 
“erotic irony.”
 Unlike Reflections of a Non-Political Man and Doctor Faustus, Death 
in Venice (1911) never uses the words “erotic irony,” but it presents it 
at work beautifully.9 Gustave Aschenbach, on holiday in Venice, falls in 
love with a fourteen-year-old Polish boy Tadzio for his incredible beauty. 
This beauty is the mirroring bodily image, Aschenbach feels, of the spirit 
and force, the ideal of beauty, that drive his aspiration to genius and its 
creation in words. What nature has accidentally done, Aschenbach would 
do at his own beck and call. The problem is that shortly after being made 
officially “von Aschenbach” and so a noble on his fiftieth birthday, he has 
hit a deep and protracted dry spell. This transgressive, even mad love for 
the boy, however, inspires the accomplished and esteemed middle-aged 
writer to raptures unknown before. Aschenbach even produces a paean 
to beauty a page and a half long! In it he recalls Socrates and Phaedrus, 
describing how the older, ugly philosopher woos the beautiful youth 
to his philosophy of the eternal forms (“Strangely fruitful intercourse, 
between one body and another mind!” [414)], Ashenbach concludes his 
prose-poem. In its middle, he perfectly describes what Mann means by 
“erotic irony.”
Thought that can merge wholly into feeling, feeling that can merge 
wholly into thought—these are the artist’s highest joy. And our solitary 
felt in himself at this moment power to command and wield a thought 
that thrilled with emotion, an emotion as precise and concentrated as 
thought: namely, that nature herself shivers with ecstasy when the mind 
bows down in homage before beauty. (413)
Of course, as with youths like Alcibiades, who want more of Socrates 
than inspired imaginations (an ironic reversal, after all, on the usual way 
such love works), or like Heloise and Abelard who both end up wanting 
more than pedagogical routine and have to settle in the end for much 
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less, Aschenbach ends up badly. He ends up stalking Tadzio, staying on 
much too long in a cholera-plagued Venice to do so, hoping against hope 
for a general breakdown of order so that the looks and smiles he and 
Tadzio belatedly share could become something more. Made-up like a 
much younger man and so looking as clownish as his lust, Aschenbach 
dies staring out to sea where Tadzio is standing on a shrinking sandbar 
mysteriously pointing farther out.
 Erotic irony is, then, the sacrifice the lover makes in homage to the 
beloved as the inspiring medium for eternal beauty’s actualization that 
the lover’s mind would create in its work, in this case, in literary art. In 
the mirror of physical beauty the artist sees the image of his creative ideal 
ready to be released into existence as a unified and unifying imagina-
tion living in and as the work of art, in which thought and feeling, mind 
and body, are organically one—a classic modernist aesthetic formulation 
already in 1911! The awful, even terrible cost of such erotic irony, for all 
concerned, is usually not dwelt upon.
 My thesis about Doctor Faustus is that it is a novel in which its nar-
rator plays the lover, and its subject, the musical genius Leverkuhn, plays 
the beloved. This is especially so now that he is dead, with the latter’s 
strangely beautiful avant-garde music, like a Dionysian nature or frac-
turing world-system, bearing sublime witness to the narrator’s acts of 
loving genius begun during Leverkuhn’s life and now completed in com-
posing this fictional life.10 What many have identified as the Tonio Kroeger 
effect, the love of the more intelligent and imaginative man for the banal 
and normal beloved thus suffers a significant variation, an ironic inver-
sion, with the self-declared ordinary and normal man, Zeitblom, bitterly 
captivated with the alleged musical genius Leverkuhn, who as a person 
appears to be virtually inhuman. Usually nowadays, of course, we think 
of this erotic pattern as “smart women, stupid choices.”
 It is here that for further clarification I must turn to Freud, to Mann’s 
Freud anyway, as Mann celebrates him in his 1936 speech in Vienna on 
the occasion of his eightieth birthday.11 With the old man sitting there, 
Mann concludes “Freud and the Future” with this incredible prophecy, 
made especially so now given how far Freud’s reputation (and human-
ism’s) has fallen in our own times:
[W]e shall one day recognize in Freud’s life-work the cornerstone for 
the building of a new anthropology and therewith of a new structure, to 
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which many stones are being brought today, which shall be the future 
dwelling of a wiser and freer humanity. This . . . psychologist will . . . be 
honored as the path-finder towards a humanism of the future, which 
we dimly divine and which will have experienced much that the earlier 
humanism knew not of. It will be a humanism standing in a different 
relation to the powers of the lower world, the unconscious, the id: a 
relation bolder, freer, blither, productive of a riper art than any possible 
in our neurotic, fear-ridden, hate-ridden world.  .  .  .  Call this, if you 
choose, a poet’s utopia; but the thought is after all not unthinkable that 
the resolution of our great fear and our great hate, their conversion into 
a different relation to the unconscious which shall be more the artist’s, 
more ironic and yet not necessarily irreverent, may one day be due to the 
healing effect of [psychoanalysis]. (426)
Well, even if we only look at the next few years, we have to wonder how 
wrong a prophecy can be!
 What Mann thinks is Freud’s key discovery is what he calls “Infantilism” 
(424), by which he means how the ego, from childhood on, identifies 
with established roles of family, class, profession, nation, or culture, and 
so, in this way only, the modern ego is like the ego of antiquity—“open 
behind” (424) to the past, to the primordial, the legendary, the fabulous, 
the mythic, in the life of a people or one’s own life, which gets repeated 
forward into the present and future, usually unwittingly for us, but in the 
case of the great heroes and heroines of the past, quite wittingly. Just as 
the child plays the game of imitating mommy or daddy, so too the adult 
would imitate the great figures of the cultural past. Mann’s examples are 
primarily ones such as Cleopatra, Caesar, and other classical figures; but 
he also claims that this identification is possible anytime, and mentions 
his own conscious following in Goethe’s footsteps. Presumably, he would 
see this imitatio dei pattern at work even with Freud, who after all was 
ecstatic at winning the 1930 Goethe Prize for Literature. Clearly, too, in 
Faustus Mann is also following in the footsteps of Nietzsche, the would-be 
music-loving and -creating philologist-philosopher. By the way, one way 
of understanding Mann’s comment in Story of a Novel (54) that Zeitblom 
and Luverkuhn possess the same identity, beyond the obvious case of their 
being the author’s characters, is that they split the Nietzschean paradigm 
in two. The cultural formulas of two Goethean souls in one breast, the 
Hegelian unhappy consciousness, are here given a Dionysian boost.
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 The poet’s new humanistic utopia that Mann envisions as being a con-
sequence of the triumph of Freud’s therapeutic vision is one in which 
anyone can wittingly participate in this reanimation of myth and be like 
Christ on the cross, who at his crisis hour cries out “Eli, Eli, lama sabach-
thami”—not as an act of final despair but as a climactic confirmation 
of living “life  .  .  .  as quotation” (425), since, as Mann glosses Christ’s 
outcry, “Jesus was [not expressing] despair and disillusionment; but on 
the contrary a lofty messianic sense of self, for Jesus is quoting from the 
prophecies of the messiah and so the quotation really meant: ‘Yes, it is I!’ 
Precisely thus did Cleopatra quote when she took the asp to her breast 
to die; and again the quotation meant: ‘Yes, it is I’” (425). A poet’s utopia 
indeed! Or at least a decadent modern aesthete’s, a life of allegory beyond 
even Keats’s imagining?
 Freud must have been taken aback by Mann’s lecture celebrating his 
achievement, his life-work, in this way. While Mann mentions some of 
Freud’s works with praise, especially, not surprisingly, Totem and Taboo, 
his characterization of Freud’s future legacy sounds less like what Mann 
calls “the science of the unconscious” (428) and more like what Jung 
claimed to have discovered, the virtually occult collective unconscious, 
that global archive of mythic archetypes, and the ways human beings 
identify with its figures, consciously or not. It is Jung, of course, a Nazi 
sympathizer, for whom the unconscious in this sense encourages what 
Paul Bove sees as the disastrous tangle of utopianism, messianism, and 
visionary allegory all of a humanistic bent.12
 There is much in “Freud and the Future” that deserves critical analysis, 
but that is for another occasion. What I want to stress here is that Mann 
concludes his lecture by assimilating the Jewish Freud to the German 
romantic tradition via the figure of Faust:
Freud once called his theory of dreams “a bit of scientific new-found land 
won from superstition and mysticism.” The word “won” expresses [the 
colonizing spirit of the scientific pioneer] and [the] spirit of his work. 
“Where id was, shall be ego,” he epigrammatically says. And he calls 
analysis a cultural labour comparable to the draining of the Zuider Zee. 
Almost in the end the traits of the venerable man merge into the linea-
ments of the grey-haired Faust, whose
     Spirit urges him
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To shut the imperious sea from the shore away,
Set narrower bounds to the broad water’s waste.
Then open I to many millions space
Where they may life, not-safe-secure, but free
And active. And such a busy swarming I would see
Standing amid free folk on a free soil.
The free folk [Mann concludes] are the people of a future freed from fear 
and hate, and ripe for peace. (428)
The topical echoes in 1936 of the infamous Nazi demands for Leben-
sraum (living-space) mingle uncomfortably with what is already an 
uncomfortable performance. Not only does Mann assimilate Freud to the 
German romantic tradition, in which science is in the service of the folk 
and associates easily with occult and even demonic phantasmagoria; he 
also identifies Freud and his discovery, psychoanalysis, as part and parcel 
of the Western colonialist adventure. Of course, it is all for the good, 
as rather sentimentally, utopianly, humanistically envisioned here. And 
Freud certainly famously declared himself to be more a conquistador 
than a scientist, a judgment we mostly share now; and too in Moses and 
Monotheism, which appears three years later, what Freud himself referred 
to as his scientific “novel,” he practices an equally strange and paradoxical 
form of cultural revisionism. Freud would “prove” that Moses, founder 
of the Jewish people as we still know them, really had to be an Egyptian. 
Just so as not to overlook any obvious echoes in the concluding passage 
cited above, the quotation from Freud that Mann cites about the theory 
of dreams being a scientific “new found land” cannot help making those 
familiar with the English literary tradition think of John Donne’s “The 
Canonization,” which uses the analogy of the discovery of America as the 
lover’s celebratory exclamation made in excited response to the sudden 
revelation of the beloved’s exquisite beauty. Since Mann read and reread 
Shakespeare and the other English Renaissance poets during the compo-
sition of his Faustus, it is no wonder there is this echo, too.
 In light of erotic irony in this elaborated sense, what, then, is all that 
music doing in Doctor Faustus? I think it is best seen as the creative imag-
ination of Adrian Leverkuhn’s beloved genius by the narrator, Serenus 
Zeitblom, who loves him that much. Its greatness, expressed in the finest 
detail of contemporaneous critical theory, is the philologist’s work, his 
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gift, however ambiguous and ambivalent it at times appears. We all recall, 
I think, what Freud said about gifts! Given the obscurity of Leverkuhn’s 
music, the opposition of the Nazi regime to it, the radically uncertain 
future it faces, not to mention its studied animus to all things popular 
or easy to take—all of which the narrator notes repeatedly as World War 
II reaches its climactically destructive end—we must remember that the 
only testimony to its genius we ever hear is Zeitblom’s lovesick praise. 
Seeing the music in the novel in this way is why I did not think it neces-
sary to mention it way back when. It just seemed so obviously so. I only 
wish that twenty-five years ago, on that MLA panel, I had not been made 
tongue-tied by Said’s initial critical intervention.
 In saying this, I do not intend to dismiss the incredible detail of the 
musical theories, or the historical discussions of music and its major fig-
ures, or the powerfully imaginative if often impressionistic responses of 
the narrator to his hero’s masterpieces. As any lover knows, and my earlier 
discussion of “Death in Venice” confirms, it is the highly crafted details 
of the gift of our love that trace the lineaments of our desire. And for 
purposes of looking at the role of such visions of music that the narrator 
ascribes to his hero, we do not need to become even amateur experts in 
the subject. We can simply recall many examples from the history of the 
novel of similar expressions, from Don Quixote on; or at the entire starry 
panoply of cosmic order in The Divine Comedy. All, all are the blazons of 
love.
 Serenus Zeitblom’s love for Adrian Leverkuhn is not an entirely happy 
love, to say the least. Adrian possesses that kind of genius easily bored. 
As a beginning student, once shown the basics, he can then foresee all 
the possible elaborations of a subject. That is, once he knows the prin-
ciples, he grows bored with the details of getting the results. They are for 
others to learn from. A top student nevertheless, Adrian is not popular 
with his teachers. He is not a good student in their eyes, precisely because 
he does not work things out unless he is forced to do so. Given his antici-
patory intellectual superiority, he is also highly disdainful, with a laugh 
that cuts other people down to size, making them self-conscious of their 
own comparative smallness. Moreover, Adrian apparently cannot recall 
their names despite long familiarity. Long before the deal with the Devil, 
who makes him swear off any feelings of love, Serenus at the end of the 
first chapter admits apropos of Adrian, “All around him lay coldness,” a 
dreadful and demonically prophetic coldness. But the narrator goes even 
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further in his disappointed, unrequited lover’s admission, an admission 
he repeats pretty much in these terms throughout the novel: “I might 
compare his [self-imposed] isolation [amidst others] to an abyss into 
which the feelings others expressed for him vanished soundlessly without 
a trace” (8). And with growing bitter vehemence, as our narrator tells his 
story he openly includes himself in the camp of the others.
 Of course, Serenus is no genius. A philologist who teaches classical 
languages and culture in the high school, with occasional sojourns as a 
part-timer in a local college, Zeitblom describes himself as a Catholic 
humanist, old-fashioned, bourgeois, happily and long married, who is 
writing now at the end of the Second World War in early retirement 
due to his quiet but firm disagreements with the Nazi regime. His sons 
are in active service to their nation, his wife dutifully cares for him, and 
his hand trembles as much for his self-consciously ironic—or is it self-
parodic—suspicion of his incapacity—intellectual, emotional, rhetorical—
as for every remembered crisis and catastrophe of the life he is telling or 
the increasing reports of bombs falling nearby and major German cities 
in flames. This montage technique, in which the time of the narrator and 
the time of the story, along with the time of the future reader, who is 
addressed as such repeatedly, join in Doctor Faustus with the modern-
ists’ appropriation of Wagner’s musical technique of the motif for the 
text’s structure of symbols and images. In doing so, Mann produces some 
remarkable temporal parallels between the individual life and the histor-
ical moment.
 Here is how Serenus memorably characterizes himself and his project:
His was an artist’s life; and because it was granted to me, an ordinary 
man, to view it from so close-up, all the feelings of my soul for human life 
and fate have coalesced around this exceptional form of human existence. 
For me, thanks to my friendship with Adrian , the artist’s life functions as 
the paradigm for how fate shapes all our lives, as the classic example of 
how we are deeply moved by what we call becoming, development, des-
tiny—and it probably is so in reality, too. For although his whole life long 
the artist may remain nearer, if not to say, more faithful to his childhood 
than the man of practical reality, although one can say that, unlike the 
latter, he abides in the dreamlike, purely human, and playful state of the 
child, nevertheless the artist’s journey from those pristine early years to 
the late, unforeseen stages of his development is endlessly longer, wilder, 
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stranger—and more disturbing for those who watch—than that of the 
everyday person, for whom the thought he, too, was once a child is cause 
for not half so many tears. (27–28)
As this passage unfolds, though it is never used, I keep hearing the 
word for culture, Bildung, chiming silently. When I check the passage in 
German, I find that it is not used. Clearly, though, it is insistently sug-
gested by the use of its variants: “Werden, Entwicklung  .  .  .  Schicksals-
Gestaltung” (42): “Becoming, Development, Shape of Destiny or Fateful 
Design.” This method of suggestive allusive implication is how the novel 
works as much as it does via the techniques of montage and leitmotif. The 
heard music of the narration is intended to inspire the unheard music in 
our minds.
 Beyond this, the passage reminds us of Goethe and Dichtung and Wah-
rheit, the quintessential romantic statement of the artist’s life, which has 
inspired so many works of autobiography and biography, literal and fic-
tional. The idea of development, Entwicklung, is the hallmark of how cre-
ative genius gets treated. It is also the way, since Hegel, that first elite and 
then popular histories of science, philosophy, art, and culture are done. 
More than this, however, it is also how living organisms have been dis-
tinguished from the inorganic realm. And this post-Enlightenment idea 
of progressive, even dialectical development (despite detours) is also what 
post-structuralism and deconstruction, following Nietzsche’s example, 
sought to blow up.
 And there are many good reasons to do so. Development assumes as 
its paradigm the individual and generalizes from it to larger units; even 
in the case of evolution, the focus, until recently, has been on the radiant 
example, the singular mutation, not the statistical whole. Development, in 
the case of genius, also entails the sacrifice of others, willing or not, to 
promote its growth, especially from youth to maturity. As we will see later 
in the novel, this is a moment when to inspire and facilitate what Zeit-
blom calls “the breakthrough” into full strength, much is permitted, even 
encouraged, by way of what used to be called sin but now is more likely 
to be called transgression. And this idea of development on the macro-
level also has precluded paying close critical attention to how power actu-
ally works—using the myth of necessary development to rationalize its 
usurpation of the state, the party, whatever, with the slaughter, sometimes 
of millions, as the all-too-usual price that just had to be paid. Finally, in 
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this passage, the narrator would appear to be explicitly making the con-
nection between his life of Luverkuhn and that of Germany. This connec-
tion, in its geo-political, even world-historical, dimensions, as well as in 
others—musical, artistic, sexual—is discussed at length in Chapter XXX, 
about which much shortly. But right now, I want to look at the cautionary 
tale the reader receives early on, in Chapter III. Not only should this 
chapter make us question (but not definitively determine) the narrator’s 
reliability—we have received lots of potential warnings about it, beginning 
on page 1, most of them coming from the narrator himself; it should also 
make us question any attempt to make connections in which one side of 
an opposition would subsume the other in a higher, dialectical synthesis. 
For such attempts are shown to be matters of myth and faith, of deceptive 
and self-deceptive illusion—aesthetic play too readily taken for truth. If I 
am reading Doctor Faustus right, it would repeal all of that Western tradi-
tion of loving genius without presenting all its tragic consequences.
 The third chapter of Doctor Faustus is where we hear about Adrian’s 
first contact with the odd combination of modern science and the occult, 
specifically necromancy, which, as Serenus tells it, haunts his life. Adrian’s 
father, Jonathan, a good wholesome German farmer (Zeitblom’s father, 
by the way, is a pharmacist in the local town) loves to “speculate the ele-
ments” (16). That is, he loves to conduct experiments that demonstrate, 
by tempting Nature to reveal her secrets, how the distinction between 
the truly living and the demonically animated dead blurs into shining 
in-distinction via such a compounding of ambiguities, ironies, and par-
adoxes. The sheer weight of phenomena forces one to give up all such 
binary oppositions in uneasy despair (the narrator’s response), in rueful 
faith (Father Leverkuhn’s response), or madly sounding knowing laughter 
(Adrian’s response), rather than resulting in any happy Hegelian synthesis.
 The chapter details ten experiments that Jonathan Leverkuhn loves 
to perform for the enlightenment and entertainment of himself and his 
family, especially the boys Adrian and Serenus. They involve demon-
strations of protective mimicry (moths, butterflies, leaves) in which one 
organism will ape the appearance of another, down to its flaws, so as to 
be also judged unpalatable or poisonous by enemies, to blend in with its 
surroundings, and so on. But also there are experiments with Chaldini’s 
sand figures, in which the scraping of a violin bow at the end of the metal 
disk on which sand is cast will cause the sand to assume the wave figures 
of the notes played. There are also observations of shells from the deepest 
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oceans with what appear to be hieroglyphic inscriptions on them, but for 
what purpose? They live in nearly total darkness and have no chance of 
being “read” in any way imaginable. There are also experiments with ice 
and other types of crystals that mimic uncannily all the features of living 
organisms and create whole miniature living-looking cities from the floors 
of their tanks, as with a tap of a magic wand at the sides. Serenus’s long 
comment on these things is worth quoting in full:
Were these [inorganic] phantasmagoria an imitation of plant life, or were 
they the pattern of it?—that was [Jonathan’s] question. Neither, he pre-
sumably replied to himself; they were parallel formations. Nature in her 
creative dreaming, dreamt the same thing both here and there, and if 
one spoke of imitation, then certainly it had to be reciprocal. Should one 
take the children of the soil as models because they possessed the depth 
of organic reality, whereas the ice flowers were merely external phenom-
ena? But as phenomena, they were the result of an interplay of matter no 
less complex than that found in plants. If I understood our friendly host 
correctly, what concerned him was the unity of animate and so-called 
inanimate nature, the idea that we sin against the latter if the boundary 
we draw between the two spheres is too rigid, when in reality it is porous, 
since there is no elementary capability that is reserved exclusively for liv-
ing creatures or that the biologist could not likewise study on inanimate 
models. (21)
I take seriously this idea of “parallel formations”—which in the German 
text are “Parallelbildungen” (33). In this composite formulation bildung 
appears, which does mean formation, but also, as we know, “culture,” the 
word I heard in a previous passage as if it were anticipating this one. The 
evocative albeit equivocal irony of this coinage in Faustus stands as fair 
warning over an interpreter’s reading. Nonetheless, I will take the plunge.
 This passage presents a different way of seeing the world and how it has 
been built up. We see here for what they are the apparently mirror images, 
which do not solicit, even as they too often have nevertheless inspired, 
humanity’s repeated attempts to mistakenly make connections, usually by 
subsuming one set of images to another as if their models. At every level 
of the novel—that of theme, point of view, plot, technique, structure—
Doctor Faustus should be seen as one of Father Leverkuhn’s experiments 
for demonstrating parallel formations in this sense and in this way of 
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warning. That is, it should be seen in the spirit of an irony about what is 
being presented that transcends parody and self-parody; or, if you will, a 
parody to end all parody, an irony to transcend irony, an absolute parody 
and irony, which turns into a modern form of tragic wisdom. It puts into 
play the artist’s life, politics, philosophy, even music—its theories, history, 
major figures, and modern developments—so as to present parallel for-
mations, repeating the cautionary lesson of this chapter, over and over 
again, which the critical reader will carefully observe and respect without 
resolving the parallelisms into a total order in which one formation or 
set of formations trumps the others. Is this deconstruction avant le lettre? 
Perhaps, but it is also related to what Adorno’s dissertation taught Mann 
about Kierkegaard, as The Story of a Novel says (76).
 The major example of not heeding such wisdom born of what I will 
call, for simplicity’s sake, absolute irony is also presented in this chapter 
via the experiment of “the devouring drop,” which can stand as an emblem 
of the radical and total assimilation of one formation by another:
And just how confusing the interaction is between the two realms we 
learned from the “devouring drop,” to which more than once Father 
Leverkuhn fed a meal before our very eyes. A drop of whatever it was—
paraffin, or some volatile oil, I don’t recall specifically, though I believe 
it was chloroform—a drop, I say, is not an animal, not even a primitive 
one, not even an amoeba; one does not assume that it has an appetite, 
seeks nourishment, knows to retain what is digestible and refuse what is 
not. But that is precisely what our drop did. It was swimming by itself in 
a glass of water into which Jonathan had introduced it, probably with a 
pipette. And what he now did was this: With a pair of pincers he picked 
up a tiny glass rod, actually a thread of glass coated with shellac, and 
placed it in the vicinity of the drop. That was all that he did, the drop did 
the rest. It formed a little convexity on its surface, a sort of mount of con-
ception, through which it then ingested the rod lengthwise. Meanwhile it 
extended itself, took on a pear shape so as to encompass its prey entirely 
and not leave either end sticking out; and as it gradually reassumed its 
spherical shape, more ovoid at first, it began, I give you my word, to dine 
on the shellac that coated the glass rod and to distribute it throughout its 
own body. When it had finished and had resumed its globular form, it 
pushed the utensil, now neatly licked clean, back across to the periphery 
and out into the surrounding water. (22)
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If we take the bait here by reading “the devouring drop” as the essence 
of being, inorganic and organic, and so beyond good and evil, thereby 
justifying every transgression by genius, group, nation, or humanity as a 
whole (vis-à-vis nature), we will have performed the simulacrum of appe-
tite (in all senses) that this passage serves up to us for our critical illu-
mination. Mann in Doctor Faustus presents the temptation of modernist 
aesthetic totality even as he both warns against it and creates a radically 
equivocal polysemous text that, despite its apparently bumbling narrator’s 
best belated efforts suffers in the end neither premature closure, nor any 
other kind. Doctor Faustus is the transgressive gift of tragic love, in an 
unreserved imaginative economy, to end all resolving harmonies. This 
modern wisdom text keeps on giving because, like great love (or absolute 
irony), it is too difficult to tell from despair.
 Paul Bove has definitively shown in his “Misprisions of Utopia: Mes-
sianism, Apocalypse, and Allegory” that critical interpretation, as its origins 
in biblical hermeneutics would suggest, would turn the textual materials 
of any and every historical moment into a self-congratulatory apocalyptic 
allegory in which a messiah figure brings ultimate redemption but at the 
price of universal catastrophe. As we see here with “the devouring drop” 
scene and will see even more so at the novel’s conclusion, the narrator, a 
philologist after all, finds the temptation to fall into this traditional pattern 
all but irresistible. Fortunately, by Mann’s deft handling of reflexive irony, 
Doctor Faustus contains much material for allegorizing and at least one 
grand allegory, of course, the pact with the devil, but presents it and any 
other possible allegory critically as a temptation to be overcome.13
 Chapter XXX of Doctor Fausus, about two-thirds of the way into 
the novel, is where Serenus Zeitblom attempts to make the connections 
between Adrian’s artist’s life and the demonically sexual nature of genius, 
the modern history of Germany, and the tragic idea of the necessarily 
transgressive form of development, what the narrator calls “the fatal gift 
of genius” (318), of every type. The word that he chooses is a good one in 
German: “the breakthrough.” Here is the word and its basic meanings, in 
itself and as it participates in common idioms, the details of which I omit 
for convenience’s sake: “Durchbruchs: falling through (no art); emerging 
appearance; coming through; breaking through; revelation; bursting, per-
foration; to assert or show itself; [Natur] to reveal itself; breakthrough, 
break open; breach; opening; rise, resurgence.”14 I think this word just 
about covers it all.
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 The narrator in Chapter XXX opens with the start of World War I 
and the general thrilling sense of terrible elation that runs through the 
German population. He continues by justifying this feeling with the idea 
that to achieve world-historical status as a nation, a distinctive people 
must manage a breakthrough into strength and identity, however tragic 
the cost, even the cost of war. It is so necessary or at least thought to be 
so necessary (317). Assuming a role on the world stage, the breakthrough 
is crucial for development; he argues similarly for the modern phase of 
German art and music. The term used throughout, virtually obsessively, 
is “the breakthrough.” In fact, the term is used so many times that it 
becomes impossible to count its occurrences.
 The phrase that is meant to unite all these senses of “the breakthrough” 
is translated in the latest English version as “the psychology of the new 
breakthrough” (323). The German original says only “die Psychologie des 
Durchbruchs” (447), italicizing the word “breakthrough” for emphasis. 
The original English translation, by the way, is here more faithful to the 
German than it usually is.15 So crucial is “the breakthrough” for the nar-
rator, who we must remember is a philologist by training and tempera-
ment and so invested in the careful scrutiny and use of words, that when 
Adrian objects to being concerned with the position of German music 
in the world, one way or the other, Zeitblom gets angry, for as he sees it, 
Adrian’s work, which is largely still to come, could only be intended for 
a cosmopolitan audience, indeed for a sophisticated and highly diverse 
audience, and not for a narrow elite of some provincial would-be avant-
garde, such as the intellectuals around him now and throughout the 
1920s. Here is how Serenus put an end to this argument:
[A]esthetics is all things, whether their effect is engaging or off-putting, 
just as . . . the ‘grace’ has the broadest possible meaning. Aesthetic deliv-
erance or confinement, that is destiny, that is what determines one’s hap-
piness or unhappiness, whether one is comfortably at home on this earth 
or lives in hopeless, if proud isolation. And one need not be a philologist 
to know that what is ugly is despised. The longing to breakthrough, to 
break free from confines, being sealed inside what is ugly—you may 
go right ahead and tell me I am threshing straw, but I feel, have always 
felt, and will plead again against all crude appearances that this is Ger-
man kat exochen, deeply German, the very definition of Germanness, 
a psychological state threatened by the poison of loneliness, by eccen-
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tricity, provincial standoffishness, neurotic involution, unspoken Satan-
ism. . . . (326)
“I broke off ” (326) Zeitblom now says, clearly aware that he has crossed 
the line. As we already know from Chapter XXV, he has received the 
letter from Adrian in the antique dialectic telling of his bargain with 
the Devil. To ensure his breakthrough into twenty-four years of sheer 
musical genius, he has agreed to surrender his soul at death and never 
to love another during life. However, if he should do so, they will die as 
do the two people whom he appears finally to love. Now, with this star-
tling “unspoken Satanism” faux pas, Adrian looks at Zeitblom, the color 
draining from his face, with a look and then a smile, which are truly 
terrible: “The look he directed at me was the look, that familiar look that 
made me unhappy—and it mattered little whether it was aimed at me 
or someone else—mute, veiled, so coldly aloof as to be almost offensive, 
and it was followed by the smile, with lips closed, nostrils twitching in 
scorn, and by his turning away” (326). Zeitblom is crushed then and 
still as he narrates the incident, speculating that his getting sick at the 
front so soon after arrival there was his unconscious way of getting back 
to Adrian, who is himself too sick with migraines to fight or give any 
service to genius.
 What Zeitblom would do via the word “breakthrough” (and the sim-
ilar “switch-words” as Freud calls them in the dream-work) is to connect 
all the dimensions of individual and cultural history in the novel into a 
single, coherent whole readable in terms of the aesthetics of recognition 
and fame, which in our time has become a matter of a rather cheapened 
celebrity. While his narrative differs in important ways from the back-
cover blurb quoted earlier, for example, in its insistence that Adrian’s 
work does not represent the Nazi regime and its aims, it does overlook 
the childhood lesson of parallel formations. Doctor Faustus performs this 
lesson repeatedly even as its self-confessed bumbling narrator apparently 
forgets it. The novel thus holds open all the lines of apparent development 
(and their ironic reversals) that its narrator (but not its author) would 
connect up and close off so as to form into a total work or masterpiece, 
even as he confesses his incompetence at writing. This is more than the 
modesty topos. It is the power of the romantic conventions governing 
the composition of the modern artist’s life. In this ironic manner, Doctor 
Faustus is a modernist novel, harkening strongly back to romantic tradi-
tions, in the process of becoming a postmodernist one.
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 The novel’s conclusion confirms this view. Leverkuhn creates his last 
great work, The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus, a tragic oratorio, as a revoca-
tion of Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” in his Ninth Symphony. Inspired by the 
terrible death from spinal meningitis of his beloved nephew Nepo (nick-
named Echo), this work takes on the significance of entailing the revoca-
tion of the bourgeois epoch from its inception in the Renaissance to the 
present of the novel, when soon after its composition in 1930, Adrian, in 
confessing his sins to his friends and family before a private performance, 
goes hideously mad right before their eyes. “Revocation” in German, by 
the way, is in its verbal form zurückziehen: “to pull or draw back; or draw 
away; to withdraw, to retire.” It is closely associated, in common idioms, 
with the notorious Hegelian term for dialectical synthesis, aufheben, but 
principally in the sense of “repeal,” not resolution.
 The idea of revocation cannot help inspiring in this student of Eng-
lish literature the memory of a famous instance from romantic poetry 
in which the hero of a minor epic must revoke the curse he pronounced 
upon his nemesis. In Prometheus Unbound, the title figure revokes his 
condemnation of Jupiter, despite long suffering and the likelihood that 
repression will return at some future moment once he liberates himself. 
This renunciation, this revocation, this literal calling back of his curse 
releases Prometheus, but it is supplemented with a warning that his hope 
of great things for all may be ruined once more by Jupiter breaking out of 
his earthly abyss. At that point, Prometheus is to construct out of the ruins 
of hope a hope beyond hopelessness—a formulation we shall shortly see 
reappear when we discuss the very end of Doctor Faustus. Of course, the 
trope of the revocation itself can be traced to other sources than Shelley. 
Mann’s immediate source, as his Story of a Novel also reports, is Adorno’s 
thesis on Kierkegaard (76).
 If the novel ended here, it would be a late great example of apocalyptic 
modernism, a gesture declaring a plague on everyone’s house, including 
especially one’s own. Joyce’s “The Dead” memorably ends this way, after 
holding out half a hope that its male protagonist can be transformed by 
his pity for his wife suffering from the memory of the young man who 
appears to have died for her. Yeats’s poem “The Second Coming” and The 
Tower volume are chock-full of apparently nihilistic visions. Such ironi-
cally apocalyptic modernism haunts even works, like The Waste Land, 
Women in Love, A Passage to India, or To the Lighthouse, that end in 
ironic ambiguity, something that many of Mann’s commentators see hap-
pening in the case of Doctor Faustus.16 We shall see.
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 Before heading for the finish line, however, and finally discussing 
music and so satisfying Said’s ghost, I want to sum up where we are so 
far. My argument is that Mann subtly reverses his usual pattern of erotic 
irony. Rather than creating a situation where the decadent representative 
of “the mind bows down in homage before beauty” with the latter being 
represented by the non-intellectual, Mann has the erotic irony operate 
between two intellectuals, both from the provinces, who achieve profes-
sional success, one of whom is said to be a genius, the other of whom, 
his lifelong friend, is a self-described “ordinary” man and tells the life of 
his artist-friend as a complex act of homage and a gift of love. Just as the 
ecstatic frisson in the usual case results from the sacrifice of intellectual 
pride and stature to a beautiful figure of otherwise less worth, so here, 
whatever his limitations and possible sins, Serenus sacrifices himself to 
Adrian, whose genius is suspect and whose humanity is seriously com-
promised even before his demonic bargain. One of the real-life parallel 
formations for this variation on Mann’s erotic irony is clearly that of deca-
dent love. Lionel Johnson and Oscar Wilde, as heterosexual and homo-
sexual late-nineteenth-century exemplars, both chose beloveds well below 
their intellectual and imagination standings. But Mann, as we know now 
from his Diaries, chose similarly, with younger men, although how far 
any relationship got remains a subject of dispute.17
 In Doctor Faustus Adrian turns to Rudoph Schwerdtfeger, a bisexual 
friend for whom he composes a violin piece, who betrays him in the 
end, and whom Adrian, it appears, has deliberately led into a fatal rela-
tionship. Adrian in his final madness confesses to doing so, and Serenus 
all along has believed this to be so. There are, of course, class, peda-
gogical, and psychological dimensions to erotic irony. The pattern of the 
older, well-established mentor and the new, young protégé, which goes 
back to the Greeks, shines through here. Various motivations for this 
pattern have been given, especially in psychoanalysis—neurotic guilt, 
self-loathing, narcissism, sadomasochism, and so on. I prefer to note its 
operative force in the novel rather than speculate on its motive. For all 
the drama of the novel is focused here, on this relationship, with that of 
Adrian’s representative artist’s life and Germany’s fateful destiny under 
the Nazis as background, albeit momentous background. Like an opera 
to end all operas?
 And so we conclude with music after all. I quote fully the relevant 
passage:
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My poor great friend! And when perusing this [last] work from his musi-
cal remains, from his own downfall, which prophetically anticipates the 
downfall and ruin of so much else, how often have I thought of the pain-
ful words he spoke to me at the death of the child, of his statement that it 
ought not to be, that goodness, joy, hope, ought not to be, that it should 
be taken back, that one must take it back! “Ah, it ought not be!”—how 
those words stand almost like an instruction, a musical direction, set 
above the choral and instrumental movements of The Lamentation of Dr. 
Faustus and contained within every measure and cadence of this “Ode to 
Sorrow”! There is no doubt that he wrote it with an eye to Beethoven’s 
Ninth, as its counterpart in the most melancholy sense of the word. But 
it is not merely that more than once it performs a formal negation of 
the Ninth, takes its back into the negative, but in so doing it is also a 
negation of the religious—by which I cannot mean its denial. A work 
dealing with the Tempter, with apostasy, with damnation—how can it be 
anything but a religious work? What I mean is an inversion, an austere 
and proud upending of meaning, such as I at least find, for example, in 
the friendly appeal by Dr. Faustus to the companions of his final hour 
that they should go to bed, sleep in peace, and be not troubled. Given the 
framework of the cantata, one can scarcely help viewing this as the con-
scious and deliberate reversal of the “Watch with me!” of Gethsemane. 
And again, his last drink with his friends . . . has all the marks of ritual, 
is presented as another Last Supper. Linked with this, however, is the 
reversal of the notion of temptation, in that Faust refuses the idea of 
salvation as itself a temptation—not only out of formal loyalty to the pact 
and because it is “too late,” but also because with all his soul he despises 
the positive optimism of the world to which he is to be saved, the lie of 
its goodness. (514)
What Serenus says next, before his final paragraph of reading this com-
position, I want to underscore that while we and the author can see its 
appropriateness to him, especially in light of what he will soon say, it 
appears that he knows not what he says, as is fitting for the lover when 
speaking about his beloved:
This [rejection of cheap optimism] becomes even clearer and is still more 
forcefully elaborated in the scene with the good old ‘physician and gossip’ 
who invited Faust to him in a pious attempt at conversion and whose role 
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is quite purposefully drawn as that of a tempter. This is an unmistakable 
reference to Jesus’ temptation by Satan, just as an ‘Apage!’ [Be gone!] is 
unmistakably found in the proudly despairing ‘No!’ spoken against false 
and flabby bourgeois piety. (514–15)
The final paragraph of the penultimate chapter is justifiably famous and 
deserves to be quoted in full:
But yet another final, truly final reversal of meaning must be recalled 
here, must be pondered with the heart, a reversal that comes at the end of 
this work of endless lament and that, surpassing all reason, softly touches 
the emotions with that spoken unspokenness given to music alone, I 
mean the cantata’s last orchestral movement, in which the chorus loses 
itself and which sounds like the lament of God for the lost state of His 
world, like the Creator’s sorrowful “I did not will this.” Here, toward the 
end, I find that the uttermost accents of sorrow are achieved, that final 
despair is given expression, and—but I shall not say it, for it would mean 
a violation of the work’s refusal to make any concessions, of its pain, 
which is beyond all remedy, were one to say that, to its very last note, 
it offers any other sort of consolation than what lies in expression itself, 
in utterance—that is to say, in the fact that the creature has been given 
a voice for its pain. No, to the very end, this dark tone poem permits no 
consolation, reconciliation, transfiguration. But what if the artistic para-
dox, which says that expression, the expression of lament, is born out of 
the construct as a whole, corresponds to the religious paradox, which says 
that out of the profoundest irredeemable despair, if only as the softest of 
questions, hope may germinate? This would be hope beyond hopeless-
ness, the transcendence of despair—not its betrayal, but the miracle that 
goes beyond faith. Just listen to the ending, listen with me: One instru-
mental group after the other steps back, and what remains as the work 
fades away is the high G of a cello, the final word, the final sound, floating 
off, slowly vanishing in a pianissimo fermata. Then nothing more. Silence 
and night. But the tone, which is no more, for which, as it hangs there 
vibrating in the silence, only the soul still listens, and which was the 
dying note of sorrow—is no longer that, its meaning changes, it stands 
as a light in the night. (515)
So our question is, how should we read this final turn of the screw, this 
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hope beyond hopelessness? Is it what the remarks about flabby bourgeois 
piety and optimism promised might come? Or is it the final gift of love 
by the narrator, that philologist, amateur player of the viola d’amour, and 
lifelong if sometimes lacking friend, who creates here his palely shining 
music of our night?
 In conclusion, I have to confess that I am unhappy with the term 
“absolute irony,” for it seems to collapse back into modernism a text 
halfway out of it, on its way to postmodernism, so to speak. It also draws 
it back even further, into the view of German romantic irony character-
ized and criticized by Hegel as “infinite absolute negativity,” something 
that Kierkegaard in his master’s thesis, The Concept of Irony, elaborated 
and practiced, ironically enough, at considerable length so as to incor-
porate both ends of the philosophical tradition that he faced at the time, 
Socrates and Hegel himself. Then, too, as I describe its action, absolute 
irony sounds like a precursor to deconstruction—the systematic disrup-
tion of all system formation by interrupting permanently the establish-
ment of a dialectical logic of binary oppositions leading progressively 
to synthesis, whether final or provisional. So how should I see Doctor 
Faustus working via its ironic—(self-) parodic?—practice of parallel for-
mations? I would like to be able to think about it, with a good conscience, 
in terms of physics, of physical systems, even entanglement, perhaps. But 
I am no expert in physics and so what I am about to say, which is very 
rough and preliminary, especially as a conclusion, may be nothing more 
than the familiar case of the humanist being a dilettante in science. If so, 
please forgive me my Faustian strain showing.
 Erotic irony occurs, you recall, when the lover pays homage to the 
beauty of the beloved by sacrificing mind, reason, good sense, good judg-
ment, and so on, a result nature is said to ecstatically enjoy. Let us think of 
this not in imaginative, aesthetic, or, certainly, moral terms but in terms 
of “energetics”—that is, in terms of how physical systems work. When a 
positively or negatively charged particle, say, an electron, leaps from one 
higher energy state to another, lower state, a burst of detectable energy is 
given off. The law of the conservation of energy requires this and requires 
that the amounts involved are parallel, balanced out, in both the equa-
tions and reality alike. So the greater the charges involved, the higher the 
initial energy state of the particle, and the lower and so the further the 
leap, the greater the resultant pop of power. Given the weight of literary 
and cultural history in Doctor Faustus, it may not be too far-fetched to 
32 | Chapter 2
think of its “absolute irony,” put so powerfully into play with that history, 
then, on this analogy of “energetics,” as if this textual gift of love were a 
virtual atomic bomb of love. But maybe Doctor Faustus is just one candle 
in the night, cursing the darkness, after all?
 As you ponder these different alternatives, interrupting permanently 
but, I would hope, never simply arresting the dialectic of development 
and Bildung, I have two words for you, which probably work best, for all 
the ghosts in earshot, if they are now sung—contrapuntal glissando no 
doubt optional: “parallel formations”!18
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My RelaTiONSHiP TO Lolita (1955; 1958) has not been an easy one. 
I chose not to read it in the 1960s when I first heard about it because of 
its subject matter (pedophilia, kidnapping, murder) and because it was 
already such a controversial success as a cultural icon (“You’ve read the 
book, now see the Stanley Kubrick movie!”) among the intellectual class 
to which I then aspired. I preferred, like my perennial hero Nietzsche, 
never to join the winning side, which doesn’t mean I always join the 
other, losing side either. Sometimes it means that, like him, I just wait, 
sitting it out, watching or ignoring the parade as it passes me by, which 
is what I did with this mid-century, modern classic novel whose narrator 
describes himself as an artist and a madman, “a murderer with a fancy 
prose style.”1 And his double in all things, Clare Quilty, is both a semi-
successful playwright and a pedophile with whom a desperate Dolores 
Haze (“my Lolita,” as Humbert repeatedly calls her throughout) manages 
her escape, only to be pressed into pornographic films, which when she 
resists, gets her thrown out of Quilty’s ersatz Gothic, libertine mansion. 
This is what was meant way back then by “literature”? I thought not. Pulp 
fiction, maybe. . . .
 Similarly, with the rest of its author’s celebrated oeuvre: just so many 
too-clever-by-half traps. Nabokov was just too famous for his self-con-
scious ironies, his reflexively elaborate games, his buried traps for the 
Deus sive Natura
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reader, all those largely parodic allusions—topical, literary, and cul-
tural; elite and popular—and the repeatedly cited pastiches of conven-
tional structures, forms, discourses, fictional scenes, styles.2 Although I 
had read—twice, with lots of guide-books—Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, and 
despite knowing Nabokov’s special disdain for this last work and even 
later portions of Ulysses, I felt his methods were just a continuation of 
late Joycean tricks to the point where they were completely hollowed-
out, mere magician’s sleights of hand, empty gestures made without any 
passion, and who needs that? In short, having read all about the would-
be enchanter Nabokov at the time, like any good college sophomore, I 
formed my opinion in cement on the basis of no experience and was 
stuck in it.
 Then, in my first semester (fall 1976) as an assistant professor at Prince-
ton University, I was assigned to teach one of the breakout sections (a 
“preceptorial,” in Princeton lingo) of a lecture course on the modern 
American novel being taught by an advanced assistant professor, Dorothy 
Klopf. (Thanks, Dorothy.) So, during the summer before I started, I read 
or reread all of the texts for the course, having gotten the syllabus in 
advance, eager-beaver that I was. Or maybe just frightened rabbit?
 I found that I liked Lolita, despite all my ignorant expectations. To 
me at that time the pedophilia (“pederosis” in Humbert’s neologism, 55) 
was not the point but the inhumanity of the narrator’s lust. I was such 
a simple young man then. What I certainly did not believe was that the 
novel was about its reflexive metafictional games—these were intellectual 
equivalents of the pornographic passages—which were hardly that even 
by mid-century standards—for its audiences: different bait for different 
readers.
 One thing crystal clear to me then too was that the authentic Euro-
pean high culture was being represented by a mere would-be genius, a 
manqué-man as Humbert virtually calls himself (one of many “manqué 
talents,” 15), an ersatz figure or, in one of our contemporary terms, a sim-
ulacrum. As I said, I was such a simple young man then. Lionel Trilling 
had spent his life warning against—and some unkind critics would say, 
exemplifying, despite himself—such bad faith sensibility. These folks have 
the imagination of genius but none of the genius, for either creativity or 
hard work.3
 But the America represented—that was what I had lived through 
myself: it was the real thing, for sure—that is, the real phony, filled with 
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all its authentic gimmicks, cons, fabrications, lies, brand X advertisings—
plastics was its watchword. And what Humbert was, a cruel pedophile 
wannabe artist and madman (that too I took as fake), and what America 
was, as represented by its impact on Dolores Haze, his Lolita: was there 
really a dime’s worth of difference between them as far as the genuine 
article was concerned? At the time I assimilated Nabokov to the neither/
nor, plague on both your houses type of high modernist irony familiar 
from Joyce or in some moments Yeats and Forster. I had not yet learned 
that in a world of fakes the fake of however horrible sort at least cannot 
logically be called inauthentic.
 Reading Lolita nearly thirty years later, and catching up on most of 
what has been written about it and its author since, I do not think the 
same way. Although I do not endorse single-mindedly his wife Vera 
Nabokov’s 1978 statement that the otherworld (Potustoronnost) is “the 
main theme” in her husband’s work, I think Lolita, like all his major texts, 
is designed as a humanistic heterocosm. In the introductions to both his 
Lectures on Don Quixote and Lectures on Literature, for just two major 
instances, Nabokov begins by stressing that literary works are new or 
original worlds unto themselves, whose details are, if they are aesthetic 
masterpieces, uniquely selected and uniquely arranged, even perhaps sin-
gularly so.4
 But at this point I hear advocates of the otherworld thesis objecting 
that this is a metafictional, while they intend a metaphysical, meaning to 
the word, although not necessarily an afterworldly one. Here is where I 
need to make some finer distinctions.
 One of the key features of literature as an institution, no matter which 
critical theorist one consults, is that of the «system» it formed as it emerged 
with the rise of the bourgeois to power at the end of the eighteenth and 
beginning of the nineteenth century. And this system is based on the idea 
of the literary work of art as a heterocosm: an “organically” composed 
model of the world as it is and/or should be.5 This literary system, both 
ideology and institution, comprises the means of production, circulation, 
evaluation, and reproduction of texts, commentaries, translations, edi-
tions, etc. Among its assumptions and justifying ideas is that the authors 
studied are geniuses, the works masterpieces; and these masterpieces pro-
duced by these geniuses, these “little worlds” unto themselves, depending 
on the genius and masterpiece under scrutiny, may correspond to, coin-
cide with, or allusively symbolize the big world of either everyday reality 
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or a higher reality, or even an intentional non-reality, a utopian or dysto-
pian vision, depending on the case at hand. In sum, the literary system or 
institution is at bottom romanticism, as revised out of a certain strain or 
set of strains in early modern or renaissance writings. All later develop-
ments in literary history—realism, naturalism, symbolism, aestheticism, 
impressionism, imagism, modernism, postmodernism, etc.—are children 
of this literary system, often now returning home to the imperial capitals 
from the margins of former empires in further revised but still recogniz-
able forms.
 The literary system, in its emergence, has as its highest term usually 
not God but Nature, or in its later symbolist and post-symbolist variation, 
“anti-nature.” Nature refers then to the proper operation of the literary 
system as it incorporates the life-works of its authors, scholars, critics, 
and, I suppose, its most devoted readers. And this proper operation? It is 
to produce visions of freedom in which individual voices compose a har-
monious order, no matter how discordant any one voice may be, so that 
the norm of what it means to be human at the heart of the literary system 
may be passed on as cultural capital. And what is this norm? Ah, there’s 
the rub. It of course varies from time to time, culture to culture, author 
to author, audience to audience, as they debate and revise in response to 
conditions.
 I generally accept this argument about the literary system, although 
unlike Northrop Frye, I would not try to generalize from it to the entire 
verbal universe and make Blakean metaphysical claims.6 Instead, I would 
turn to Spinoza to make claims about Lolita and the literary system as 
parts of one nature, one world. In Nabokovian terms, the otherworld for 
the creative reader is, and can only be, this world.
 I know: Spinoza? If one says his name today, the likely response is 
to paraphrase something from Deleuze, his contemporary champion, 
and then say that post-structuralist stuff is all history now anyway.7 But 
I want to argue that Spinoza is still viable for us once we return to him 
and read the Ethics for ourselves.8 This is my experiment.
 Spinzoa defines God, the mind (its origin and nature), human bondage 
to emotions, the power of the intellect or human freedom. None of what 
you might expect concerning these topics will you find in the pages of 
the Ethics. Yes, “the intellectual love of God” is the highest value, but 
what Spinoza means by that is something else again. But I need to focus 
on only a few things for my purposes here.
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 The famous, indeed infamous, phrase drawn from this posthumously 
published book is “Deus, sive Natura,” God or Nature. Since it was the 
seventeenth century, one understands why these were fighting words. For 
Spinoza, God or Nature refers in two different ways to the one substance 
that is the infinite universe and everything in it. God (to simplify my 
exposition, I will usually say “God” in what follows, except when I want 
to stress a point, so please also understand “or Nature” or that I am being 
pointed) has two infinite attributes, à la Descartes no doubt: extension 
and thinking. The mind and the body of human beings are finite versions 
of God. What is more, the mind is the idea of the body the body forms, 
even as the body and the mind cannot directly affect each other causally. 
The chain of causation of the mind and that of the body are separate 
but can indirectly affect each other via the ideas arising about each. All 
actions of the mind, of the body, are determined by causes, even if we 
do not know what they may be, and our ideas about them are confused 
and fragmentary, not clear and distinct—terms Spinoza again takes over 
from Descartes. It was the times. The freedom we have is that of learning 
what those causes (all modes or affections of God) specifically are and of 
producing our own appropriate cause to affect it and its effects. In this 
Spinoza, then, knowledge is naturally the highest value, and since God is 
the source of the greatest knowledge, the intellectual love of God makes 
a lot of sense if we want to maximum our albeit limited or determinate 
freedom.
 What are the kinds of knowledge we possess? Here is Spinoza:
1.  From individual objects presented to us through the senses in a frag-
mentary [multilate] and confused manner without any intellectual 
order  .  .  .  and therefore I call such perceptions “knowledge from 
casual experience.”
2.  From symbols. For example, from having heard or read certain 
words we call things to mind and we form certain ideas of them 
similar to those through which we imagine things.  .  .  .Both these 
ways of regarding things I shall in future refer to as “knowledge of 
the first kind,” “opinion,” or “imagination.”
3.  From the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas 
of the properties of things.  .  .  .  I shall refer to this as “reason” and 
“knowledge of the second kind.” Apart from these two kinds of 
knowledge, there is, as I shall later show, a third kind of knowledge, 
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which I shall refer to as “intuition.” This kind of knowledge proceeds 
from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of 
God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things. (51)
So we possess three kinds of knowledge, according to Spinoza: 1) opinion 
or imagination, 2) reason, and 3) intuition. This tripartite division looks 
familiar to us from Kant, with his sensibility (including imagination), 
understanding, and reason, the last two names of which make things 
clearer. Spinoza means by reason what Kant means by understanding, 
namely, calculating, piecemeal or incremental reasoning (not to say ratio-
nalizing), the step-by-step ratio following the chains of cause and effect, 
and the logical anticipation of what must follow in the series of causes 
and effects; and he means by intuition what Kant means by reason, what 
Wordsworth calls imagination in its most exalted mood: the intuition of 
where we fit in the vision of God or Nature, which is like the sudden 
simultaneous vision of all the phases of a process in an instant, what 
Spinoza calls sub species aeternitate. The example Spinoza gives here to 
demonstrate that each kind of knowledge, based on the perception of, 
reasoning about, and intuition of proportions and ratios of numbers, is a 
complicated one, so I will chose another example he gives later, to illus-
trate a somewhat different point, but I will treat it as an instance in the 
Spinozian spirit of his more familiar geometrical method.
 Here is the example:
The nature of a circle is such that the rectangles formed from the seg-
ments of its intersecting chords are equal. Hence an infinite number of 
equal rectangles are contained in a circle, but none of them can be said to 
exist except insofar as the circle exists, nor again can the idea of any one 
of these rectangles be said to exist except insofar as it is comprehended 
in the idea of the circle. (33)
Imagination, reasoning, and the intuition of the geometrical principles 
for the formation of circles, chords, and rectangles—all are nicely dem-
onstrated in this one instance. To put it another way: We experience a 
world of chords and must construct the circle from our partial experi-
ences, but at a certain point in our learning experience we intuit the 
whole—circle and chords generating and constituting each other and our 
experience. (It can also work vice versa.) We see that vision with a clarity 
Deus sive Natura | 39
and distinction and so a certainty as surely as we know any principle or 
law that exceeds the merely empirical collection of details. We become 
active, creative readers of the cosmos that we live in and are. What Spi-
noza performs in this example and in his text as a whole is the logic of 
such formations, per se. His Ethics, in other words, whatever its value 
as a contribution to philosophy—metaphysics, epistemology, ethics—is 
a major contribution to the aesthetics of textual production that will be 
enshrined in what is to come in literary and intellectual history. Thanks 
to its adoption, revision, and incorporation by Kant and Hegel in their 
influential work, Spinoza’s life-work permeates the literary system from 
romanticism to postmodernism and beyond.
 In claiming this, I want to underscore, I am not making a comment, 
critical or otherwise, on the validity of Spinoza’s Ethics. I am not trying to 
reduce or deconstruct it, nor am I saying that it is an allegory of anything 
or that it prophetically surveys allegories to follow. What I am claiming 
is that Spinoza’s Ethics formulates originally and most purely the logic of 
textual production carried out by the conventions of the literary system 
in work after work, text after text. It is an instance of what it outlines, 
as are the texts of the literary system to come. It is like the literary sys-
tem’s “schematics,” which have now gone global, virtual, and viral on the 
Internet.
 Here is Nabokov’s intuition of such a logic of reading in a celebrated 
passage on the positional power of poetry taken from his revised autobi-
ography, Speak, Memory (1951; 1967)
But then, in a sense, all poetry is positional: to try to express one’s posi-
tion in regard to the universe embraced by consciousness, is an imme-
morial urge. The arms of consciousness reach out and grope, and the 
longer they are the better. Tentacles, not wings, are Apollo’s natural mem-
bers. Vivian Bloodmark, a philosophical friend of mine, in later years 
used to say that while the scientist sees everything that happens in one 
point of time, the poet feels everything that happens in one point of 
time. Lost in thought, he taps his knee with his wandlike pencil, and at 
the same instant a car (New York license plate) passes along the road, 
a child bangs the screen door of neighboring porch, an old man yawns 
in a misty Turkestan orchard, a granule of cinder-gray sand is rolled by 
the wind on Venus, a Docteur Jacques Hirsch in Grenoble puts on his 
reading glasses, and trillions of other such trifles occur—all forming an 
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instantaneous and transparent organism of events, of which the poet (sit-
ting in a lawn chair, at Ithaca, N.Y.) is the nucleus. (218)
Vivian Bloodmark is, of course, an anagram of Vladimir Nabokov. The 
expansiveness and self-irony, even self-parody, as in Nietzsche’s idea 
of “the buffoonery of an emotion,” go hand in hand.9 To Spinoza-ize 
Nietzsche, the energies of the body, in battling each other for expres-
sive release, inspire opposing images of each other, seeking to subsume 
and arrange a hierarchy of forces under themselves. God (or Nature) is 
simply the generic name for whichever side wins the latest battle in this 
endless war of affects, passions, and their active self-imaginations. Sooner 
or later, Nietzsche reminds us, the new favorite “ass” takes the stage.10 A 
momentary stay against confusion thus supervenes, with tragic or comic 
resonances and reverberations.
 Spinoza outlines the lineaments of the new symbolic order of virtually 
infinite imaginaries. And Lacan’s real, since I am on that roll now? If we 
remember that the mind is the body’s idea of itself in action, then the 
following passage surely points to it:
The mind’s intellectual love toward God is the love of God wherewith God 
loves himself not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explicated 
through the essence of the human mind considered under a form of eter-
nity. That is, the mind’s intellectual love toward God is part of the infinite 
love wherewith God loves himself. (157, italics Spinoza’s)
Nabokov, again citing this “friend” (or himself), names the power of the 
poet to envision life performatively along similar lines: “cosmic synchro-
nization” (218). And all God’s children be poets, in principle. Whether 
we think back to Spinoza and his discussion of God (or Nature) as the 
one substance of the universe, or further back to the Stoics and their 
vision of Cosmic Reason, or forward again to Rousseau and his “sense 
of being” and Wordsworth and his “sense sublime of something far more 
deeply interfused,” or forward still to later ironic writers, such as T.  S. 
Eliot in “Preludes,” or even the furthest forward for now to us, making 
our trivial entries, each one of us positionally a poet, probably, on Face-
book or some other popular social networking site, the world expands 
ever outward, spiraling out from the nucleus of a notation to the whole 
of the inscribed universe—or so it seems.11 “Self-love,” as Oscar Wilde 
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deconstructively opined (avant la lettre of Derrida or Lacan), “is the 
beginning of a life-long romance”—for Deus sive Natura, too, apparently. 
After such self-irony, self-parody, who needs them?
 “A colored spiral in a small ball of glass, this is how I see my own life” 
(275). Again and yet again, the logic of the text unfolds outward with the 
blazon of Deus sive Natura—or their equivalents—at its invisible heart. 
This is so for the creative reader.
 Nabokov celebrates what he calls “the creative reader.”
The good reader is one who has imagination, memory, a dictionary, and 
some artistic sense—which sense I propose to develop in myself and in 
others whenever I have the chance. Incidentally, I use the word reader 
very loosely. Curiously enough, one cannot read a book: one can only 
reread it. A good reader, a major reader, an active and creative reader is a 
rereader. And I shall tell you why. When we read a book for the first time 
the very process of laboriously moving our eyes from left to right, line 
after line, page after page, this complicated physical work upon the book, 
the very process of learning in terms of space and time what the book 
is about, stands between us and artistic appreciation. When we look at 
a painting we do not have to move our eyes in a special way even if, as 
in a book, the picture contains elements of depth and development. The 
element of time does not really enter in a first contact with a painting. In 
reading a book, we must have time to acquaint ourselves with it. We have 
no physical organ (as we have the eye in regard to a painting) that takes 
in the whole picture and then can enjoy its details. But in a second, or 
a third, or fourth reading we do, in a sense, behave towards the book as 
we do towards a painting. However, let us not confuse the physical eye, 
that monstrous achievement of evolution, with the mind, an even more 
monstrous achievement. A book, no matter what it is—a work of fiction 
or a work of science (the boundary line between the two is not as clear 
as is generally believed)—a book of fiction appeals first of all to the mind. 
The mind, the brain, the top of the tingling spine, is, or should be, the 
only instrument used upon a book. (3–4)
Such a creative reader would be able to see, as in the sense of Spinoza’s 
third kind of knowledge, that Speak, Memory  repeatedly anticipates in 
partial forms the final form of the vision of “cosmic synchronization” we 
discussed previously. Of course, not in a solemn spirit, but with ludic 
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excess, as is Nabokov’s wont. Similarly, the creative reader would see the 
same repeated partial anticipation of the vision concluding Lolita that 
Nabokov singles out in his famous afterword as containing the human-
istic moral of the novel. Before turning to those passages, however, I want 
to spell out, based on Nabokov’s broad hints in this passage, who is the 
creative reader par excellence.
 Clearly—and distinctly!—the creative reader, the good reader, is first of 
all the author himself:
The good reader is one who has imagination, memory, a dictionary, and 
some artistic sense—which sense I propose to develop in myself and in 
others whenever I have the chance. (3)
The author of the text is like Spinoza’s God—or Nature!—in his cosmic 
vision of things by virtue of working through the imagination of sen-
suous details to a step-by-step rereading that follows the logic of the text’s 
unfolding to a simultaneous intuition of the principle, the rule, of this 
text’s formation. So too the good reader, the creative rereader is all of 
us—potentially, in our avatar guises as Deus sive Natura, following suit. 
I mean, ideally so, of course, that as with any regulative ideal supporting 
the intellectually loving norms of good reading, Nabokov himself in prac-
ticing criticism strongly endorses and underwrites herein.
 “On a Book Entitled Lolita” is now printed as an afterword to most 
editions of the novel, a total of some fourteen million sold as of a decade 
or so ago. And now we have Kindle or Nook or iPad with our Lolita on 
them as they are on our laps. The general aim of the novel, as of any lit-
erary work, is not, Nabokov classically stipulates, a moralizing message 
(“in tow”) but an ethic of humane intellectual ecstasy:
Lolita has no moral in tow. For me a work of fiction exists insofar as it 
affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss, that is a sense of being 
somehow, somewhere, connected with other states of being where art 
(curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm. (314–15)
That is, for the creative reader first of all, the author, the text is one sub-
stance existing in the dimensions of time and space like a world where 
aesthetic bliss in Nabokov’s unfolding multifarious sense exists: the novel, 
fiction, literature is the otherworld. And if Spinoza should be right, it is 
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the real world, too.
 Here is Nabokov pointing out what he calls “the nerves of the novel” 
(316) which he rediscovers on rereading:
Every serious writer . . . is aware of this or that published book of his as 
a constant comforting presence. Its pilot light is steadily burning some-
where in the basement and a mere touch applied to one’s private thermo-
stat instantly results in a quiet little explosion of familiar warmth. This 
presence, this glow of the book in an ever accessible remoteness is a most 
companionable feeling, and the better the book has conformed to its pre-
figured contour and color the ampler and smoother its glows. But even 
so, there are certain points, byroads, favorite hollows, that one evolves 
more eagerly and enjoys more tenderly than the rest of one’s book. I have 
not reread Lolita since I went through the proofs in the spring of 1955 
but I find it to be a delightful presence now that it quietly hangs about 
the house like a summer day which one knows to be bright behind the 
haze. (315–16)
I am not sure if the enjoyment recollected here is all that far in its linea-
ments from both Spinoza’s intellectual love of God and Humbert’s more 
extensively self-loving kind. Despite Nabokov’s best intention, Freud pops 
up in our minds—okay, in my dirty mind. I suppose one could claim 
that Humbert Humbert reaching the climax to end all climaxes against 
Lolita’s squirming thighs and left buttock on the couch in her house while 
mother Charlotte is at church is a demonic parody of Freud, Spinoza, and 
Nabokov’s own joy. Being able to see many opposing things converging 
into one is something both Nabokov and Spinoza prize. But oh that last 
“punny” word—haze. (Lolita’s given name, we recall with a minor jolt, is 
Dolores Haze.)
 In any event, Nabokov proceeds in the rest of the passage to single 
out “the nerves of the novel,” paying particular attention, by its climactic 
placement in the expansively spiraling series, to Humbert’s vision in the 
valley:
And when I thus think of Lolita, I seem always to pick out for spe-
cial delectation such images as Mr. Taxovich, or that class list of Rams-
dale School, or Charlotte saying “waterproof,” or Lolita in slow motion 
advancing toward Humbert’s gifts, or the pictures decorating the stylized 
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garret of Gaston Godin, or the Kasbeam barber (who cost me a month 
of work), or Lolita playing tennis, or the hospital at Elphinstone, or pale, 
pregnant, beloved, irretrievable Dolly Schiller dying in Gray Star (the 
capital town of the book), or the tinkling sounds of the valley town com-
ing up the mountain trail (on which I caught the first known female of 
Lycaeides sublivens Nabokov). These are the nerves of the novel. These 
are the secret points, the subliminal co-ordinates by means of which the 
book is plotted. (316)
And plotted not so much for meta-fictional ironies, parodies, or the like, 
as for the aesthetic bliss Nabokov loves.
 While Humbert sits in his car awaiting the police to catch up with him, 
he recalls suddenly the vision he suffers on a mountain road shortly after 
Lolita ran off with Quilty:
One day, soon after her disappearance, an attack of abominable nausea 
forced me to pull up on the ghost of an old mountain road that now 
accompanied, now traversed a brand new highway, with its population 
of asters bathing in the detached warmth of a pale-blue afternoon in 
late summer. After coughing myself inside out, I rested on a boulder, 
and then, thinking the sweet air might do me good, walked a little way 
toward a low stone parapet on the precipice side of the highway. Small 
grasshoppers spurted out of the withered roadside weeds. A very light 
cloud was opening its arms and moving toward a slightly more substan-
tial one belonging to another, more sluggish, heavenlogged system. As 
I approached the friendly abyss, I grew aware of a melodious unity of 
sounds rising like vapor from a small mining town that lay at my feet, 
in a fold of the valley. One could make out the geometry of the streets 
between blocks of red and gray roofs, and green puffs of trees, and a ser-
pentine stream, and the rich, ore-like glitter of the city dump, and beyond 
the town, roads crisscrossing the crazy quilt of dark and pale fields, and 
behind it all, great timbred mountains. But even brighter than those qui-
etly rejoicing colors—for there are colors and shades that seem to enjoy 
themselves in good company—both brighter and dreamier to the ear than 
they were to the eye, was that vapory vibration of accumulated sounds 
that never ceased for a moment, as it rose to the lip of granite where I 
stood wiping my foul mouth. And soon I realized that all these sounds 
were of one nature, that no other sounds but these came from the streets 
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of the transparent town, with the women at home and the men away. 
Reader! What I heard was but the melody of children at play, nothing but 
that, and so limpid was the air that within this vapor of blended voices, 
majestic and minute, remote and magically near, frank and divinely enig-
matic—one could here now and then, as if released, an almost articulate 
spurt of vivid laughter, or the crack of a bat, or the clatter of a toy wagon, 
but it was all really too far for the eye to distinguish any movement in 
the lightly etched streets. I stood listening to that musical vibration from 
my lofty slope, to those flashes of separate cries with a kind of demure 
murmur for background, and then I knew that the hopelessly poignant 
thing was not Lolita’s absence from my side, but the absence of her voice 
from that concord. (307–8)
Some of Nabokov’s best commentators simply do not buy this climactic 
vision. Either Nabokov does not carry off Humbert’s conversion, in a 
case of too much, too late, and all at once; or, given its position out of 
chronological order, this vision is too clever by half, clearly having special 
pleading designs on the reader—witness Humbert’s campy direct address 
à la Jane Eyre; or it is too much of Nabokov shining through Humbert 
here and so fictional illusion is broken. I agree with this view, but the 
breaking of illusion is not done here in the interest of gamesmanship but 
of humanity, granting it as much to Humbert as to Dolores, by imagina-
tively presenting them, each in their own tragically meeting worlds, to 
the creative reader for critical judgment, as character, reader, and author 
coincide in an instant approximating, as best the finite can, the infinite, 
the divinely creative, visionary love.
 For me, this vision is thus a case of “cosmic synchronization” if there 
ever was one. It is the unfolding point of the whole novel. Some of its 
evident pedigree: Rousseau’s “sense of being” from Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker; any number of Wordsworthian visions; Blakean minute particles 
and fugitive creative moment; Emeronsian transcendental Genius or 
Nature; Paterian moments of the tragic dividing of forces in a person; 
Joycean epiphanies; Woolf ’s moments of being; Heidegger’s moment of 
vision when the call of conscience repeats the subject’s resolute com-
mitment to its better angel; even Mallarmé’s famous definition of poetic 
beauty as the perfect rose missing from all the bouquets (like that “first 
known female of Lycaeides sublivens Nabokov” from nature?); or pick one 
of your own. This is your literary institution at work. In mentioning these 
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names, I may seem to be claiming too much for Nabokov or simply cov-
ering for the visions that I missed in Milton, Dante, the Bible, or some 
Russian classic: so be it!
 What I propose is that we divide this vision between Humbert and 
his creator and best reader, much as Lionel Trilling does with Joyce and 
Gabriel Conroy in his commentary on the famous cosmic vision of the 
snow falling faintly through the universe on all the living and the dead at 
the end of “The Dead.”12 Joyce magnanimously grants his creature a share 
in this vision so that Conroy, not known previously in the story for his 
generosity of spirit or acute self-knowledge, may see and feel—at least to 
some degree—what Joyce sees and feels about the human condition and 
how best to respond to it, with “generous tears” for all concerned. I think 
the demonic fusion of Quilty and Humbert in the wrestling scene we have 
just read, in which the former is murdered by the latter, is comic prepara-
tion for what turns into an imaginative fusion of a higher kind, in which 
Humbert and Nabokov—and we fellow readers of “the friendly abyss”—
become, after Humbert and we too perhaps, get over an acute case of 
Sartrean nausea, part of “one nature” (307)—or God. In perceiving imag-
inatively Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge via Nabokov’s “cosmic syn-
chronization” of Deus sive Natura, the creative reader coincides moments 
at a time with the loftiest vision of human potential in this or any other-
world.
 Lest this proposal appear too sentimental for any hardnosed critic, 
despite my subtle use of the Jesuitical double-truth, adapted from Aver-
roes—hardly sentimentalist any of them—I also would like to suggest 
in conclusion that becoming, momentarily, avatars of the creative (re-) 
reader function in Nabokov’s Lolita, Deus sive Natura, may sound less 
glamorous or sublime if we remember what kind of novel we are in—and 
what kind of pornographic scenes Clare Quilty appears to specialize in. 
Orgies would be Nabokov’s old word; “cluster-fucks” would now be our 
brand-new one no doubt.
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THeSe  l iNeS , a few pages from the end of the Atrophied Preface 
attached to Naked Lunch, combine the major features of this anti-nov-
el’s novel discourses.2 As a would-be fictional memoir of the surreal and 
visionary experiences in Tangier of its putative author, William Lee, 
while taking the cure (yet again) for his addiction to heroin and other 
substances, these lines cram together willy-nilly a handful of discursive 
strains. The address to the reader, a century out of date, is knowing, hip-
ster parody/pastiche, and yet, strangely as such, it is nonetheless being 
used to convey the sincerely meant message that what follows should be 
read as true advice in this explicitly self-advertised “how-to” book (in 
the original introduction, 199–206). The seeing of God is the romantic 
or transcendental “other level of experience” in danger of being totally 
lost (187) to homogeneous barbaric trivialization in the post-war atomic 
age of emergent worldwide consumerism. “The desecration of the human 
image,” which the novel both renders and focuses as “an assault upon the 
reader,” is an ultimately self-destructive desecration, ironically squared 
visionary Contact 
in the interzone
On the beat State in Naked Lunch
Gentle reader, we see God through our assholes in the flash bulb of 
orgasm . . . Through these orifices transmute your body . . . The way OUT 
is the way IN . . . .” (191)1
C h A P t e r  4
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(Letters 365). For we can thus see God now only via such a literally vile 
orifice due to the body’s revolt against its oppressive normalization by a 
newly global, instrumental American culture, which knows as recogni-
tion of identity only the celebrity of its deviant sexualities. The mysti-
cism of St. John Perse, as translated by T. S. Eliot’s own late mysticism, is 
revised for this present occasion, just as the basic modernist techniques 
of ironic juxtaposition, cinematic montage, and collage-like mosaics of 
The Waste Land are put to use throughout this text’s apparently randomly 
assembled collection of perversely surreal, vaudeville-like routines, as if 
Abbott and Costello were sadomasochistic, gay, and on junk—and two 
parts of the same psyche.
 Beat attitude, ironically antique narrative gestures, modernist literary 
techniques, therapeutic guidebook point of view, sociological critique, 
tabloid and pornographic pop-cultural sensationalism, mystical visionary 
purposes, and intentionally obscene, even criminal (for the time) models 
of selfhood—all these elements knock against each other, never fusing 
into the usual seamless whole-cloth of the secondary revisionary lie à 
la the dream in Freud’s famous analyses. Naked Lunch is closer to the 
raw dream-stuff than any other would-be fictional rendition of primary 
processes, despite (or because of ?) its famously mediated composition by 
several hands and random events. And yet, it is most like a repeated lyric 
cri du coeur in which schizoid word salads are as likely as faux illiteracy.3
 Brian Edwards usefully terms all this intentional debris or waste as 
a project for “disorienting the national subject” (158), a process of dis-
ruption and subversion that, as Edwards cites Deleuze as claiming, 
can produce the equivalent of a foreign language within language, “a 
grammar of disequilibrium” (158). Composed from letters and routines 
originally written to and for Allen Ginsburg, Naked Lunch, the quintes-
sential instance of collective composition by Burroughs and his Beat 
buddies, Ginsburg, Kerouac, and others, produces its “grammar of dis-
equilibrium” to disorient the Cold War American subject of the straight 
story, and linear narrative development, of facile binary oppositions, of 
McCarthyism and homophobia, of racism and sexism, in the interest of 
a vision of future possibility existing in a visionary now, a preposterous 
moment when the International Zone that is the multi-planed Tangier, or 
what Burroughs nicknames these many different Tangiers for diplomats, 
expatriate artists, cold warriors, nationalist and revolutionary native par-
ties, and, back home, avid American consumers of popular media images 
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of this most “notorious” city: “The Interzone.” It hovers between its ear-
lier administration by ten nations and its reincorporation into the new, 
independent Morocco. This period, roughly coinciding with Burroughs’s 
continuous residence there (1954–57), extends his extraterritorial rights 
as an American in Tangier (his portable exceptionalism), even as it opens 
him to the potential violence against such Euro-American imperialist 
exploiters of hungry Arab boys for sex and to a growing understanding of 
possession by this spectral shadow that only this space beyond national or 
effective international control fosters. Tangier at this period is a haven for 
every form of investment speculation, criminal transgression, libertarian 
marketplace of desires, and revolutionary or utopian hopes. As such, 
despite its apparent differences, it prefigures remarkably our contempo-
rary moments of fugitive breakdown in the global world system. Naked 
Lunch, in this context, is not only, or rather not primarily, a visionary epic 
in the tradition of Blake’s Jerusalem, but also, or even more so, a visionary 
initiation that passes a last judgment, much as Blake’s Milton does, upon 
all—including the recalcitrant dimension of the creative subject—that 
would block access to the imaginative sources of ethical knowledge and 
radical enlightenment. It is not simply, in other words, the U.S. national 
subject that Naked Lunch would disorient; it is that subject’s parasitic exis-
tence in and fatalistically demonic possession of the would-be visionary 
writer William Burroughs that must be more than disoriented. It must be 
expelled and abjected, in its turn, within the innovative, multidimensional, 
and ceremonial spaces of Burroughs’s savagely comic routines, his modern 
form of the medieval dream-vision psychomachia. This interstitial zone of 
judgment and self-judgment is what I mean by “the Beat State.” It is multi-
dimensional, equally external and internal conditionality, which inspires 
and supports, transiently to be sure, such transformative textual, personal, 
and political emergences exemplified by the creation of Naked Lunch and 
its universally singular triumph.
 “‘Possession’ they call it  .  .  . Sometimes an entity jumps in the body—
outlines waver in yellow orange jelly—and hands move to disembowel 
the passing whore or strangle the nabor [sic] child in hope of allevi-
ating a chronic housing shortage” (184). What Burroughs foregrounds 
in these lines is his latter-day version of the theory of genius. His is like 
Yeats’s more famous theory: “I shall find the dark grow luminous, the 
void fruitful, when I understand I have nothing, that the ringers in the 
tower have appointed for the hymen of the soul a passing-bell.” That is, 
50 | Chapter 4
it is modeled on rape, total if temporary usurpation of the host-body-
psyche by what in the introduction to the 1985 publication of Queer he 
calls, thanks to Brion Gysin’s coinage, “the ugly spirit” (xix). This spirit is 
attracted to the disintegrating mask of public persona. Due to passionate 
love or passionate addiction or really any expression of passion, Bur-
roughs sees the mask fall apart. And like a ghost attracted to the blood 
of the sacrificed sheep in the fosse at the entrance to Hades in Homer’s 
Odyssey, the daemonic being enters and possesses the writer, wholly, not 
only to inspire writing but even more to act out in the world, to lead 
from the performance of one routine or another, in a bar or at a party, 
to the fulfillment of destructive intentionality—whether writer’s, victim’s, 
daemon’s, or all of them at once combined.
 At best, the writer can hope to patrol the perimeters to ward off poten-
tial invaders and to monitor and prevent, if possible, potential acting out. 
Burroughs learns to do this from the accidental death of his wife, Joan 
Vollmer, who died when they attempted to do a William Tell routine, with 
Burroughs shooting a glass of champagne off her head with his 45 revolver. 
This blood sacrifice, Burroughs claims here, inadvertently made him into 
a writer, for by thereafter having to channel his routines into writing, he 
also learned to write his way out of complete domination by the ugly spirit 
so that he could discover the gentle reader of his would-be audience and 
muse—at first particular potential love-partners, Lewis Marker and Allen 
Ginsberg, and then generalized to his readership at large. A gentle reader 
would vanquish the ugly spirit via the gift of inspiration.
 Burroughs, in his letters and journal-entries attributed to his writer-
surrogate William Lee, thinks he discovers via analysis and his imagi-
native memoir writing the traumatic origins of his troubled gay subjec-
tivity—split between self-acceptance and self-loathing—in his being made 
to perform oral sex, when a toddler, on his nanny Mary’s boyfriend. Then 
again when three years old, and being forced by an older boy to do the 
same, he bites down hard on the latter’s penis, getting a delayed revenge 
and causing a tempest in the household, or so he remembers it.
 Of course, it would be too easy to see Naked Lunch in light of any 
reductive analogy with these origins, as an act of revenge on straight 
society mounted (from the rear, as it were) by an aggressively Beat gay 
hipster. But to feel even a touch assaulted by Naked Lunch is to feel, I 
think, what the Ugly Spirit, as channeled by Burroughs, intends the 
Gentle Reader to feel, thereby establishing authentic “contact,” a word 
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that, in all its possible senses, is the signal guide to the value system Bur-
roughs maintains throughout his life-work.
 To understand why this situation arises, however, we do not need to 
repeat well-known biographical or historical facts. Rather, we need to 
understand the rather neglected crisis in the literary system that Naked 
Lunch instances. Basically, this crisis can best be expressed in a ques-
tion—what is it that we know when we know a work of literature? Is it 
an ideological illusion perpetrated by the bourgeois upon the rest of us 
in support of their life-world? Is it a more human form of understanding 
than natural or social sciences can give us? If so, to what extent is it 
different from knowledge of the deceptions and self-deceptions human 
beings are heir to? What positive knowledge, moral or otherwise, beyond 
the world-wise reinforcement of a radical skepticism, does literature as a 
cultural institution and practice grant us readers? Is the knowledge that 
we gain only knowledge of ourselves as members of some identity group 
or other? Or if it is knowledge of general human nature, as tradition-
ally contended, how is it different from what we learn elsewhere more 
readily via a more rigorous and disciplined method? Surely the Kinsey 
Reports on human sexuality give greater knowledge of American sexual 
practices than literature has done up until that time. In short, the lit-
erary system, and especially the novel, were at the time being challenged 
and made to seem outmoded not only by modern popular media, such 
as photography, movies, radio, and TV, but by the inability to provide a 
serious defense of literature as anything other than socially sanctioned 
imaginary play therapy, essentially no better than pipedreams, for real 
problems. Although Burroughs asserts repeatedly that his routines, like 
dreams, could break into reality at any time, just as any reality could pass 
into the dream-world to become enlarged and transfigured there, what 
Naked Lunch demonstrates, more than this claim, is that knowledge that 
literature grants us, for better and for worse.
 Such knowledge is the instantaneous intuition of all phases of the 
development of an entity, or, in the extreme-limit case of the idea of god, 
of the totality of entities. This intuitive knowledge is not derived from 
sense-data or from the operation of conceptual categories, but is gener-
ated in the discovery of the definitive principle for a being, or for the 
whole, at whatever level or scope. Just as we can determine the nature 
of the circle from the right angles, infinite in number, that constitute the 
circle’s all possible chords, so too can we know the principle of develop-
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ment of a being, its rule or law, from the operation of our imagination of 
it. Like any other art at its best, literature in its respective fashion com-
pletes the draft of being. To paraphrase the romantic visionary terms of 
Wallace Stevens, from “Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour,” we can 
say that the finite imagination of the text and the infinite imagination 
of god become one: the inherent emergent development of the literary 
system coincides in principle with a particular writer’s singular composi-
tion. We can see the nature of the expressive future. What Naked Lunch 
reveals emerging is the fatally mad collective mind of full-blown con-
sumer culture. It is the fictional memoir of its conception, gestation, birth, 
and death throes, composing an intellectual and emotional complex, an 
iconic cultural image, all presented in an instant of time. In saying this, 
I mean to underscore the essentially modernist project of Naked Lunch, 
even as it presents a vision of the divine perhaps more appropriate to the 
postmodernist nightmares of Jacques Lacan commenting on the god of 
the psychotic Dr. Schreber.
 In fact, Schreber’s god has a lot in common with the most bizarre 
characteristics of Naked Lunch. Long, protoplasmic tendrils or tentacles 
of light grope the soul and impregnate the receptive subject ready to give 
birth to the new messiah. The latter is to save us from the end of the 
world apocalypse that has just happened all because one morning, while 
dressing, Schreber has thought it might be nice to be a woman, having 
more pleasure than any man can have. It is as if Schreber’s vision com-
pletes that of Burroughs.
 From a Lacanian perspective, God, whether Schreber’s or any other’s, is 
the conventional name for the Big Other, that illusory other of the other 
and ourselves, the Father, who ensures the threat of castration so that the 
socially symbolic system of signification works from gender division on 
up the ladder. And it would be interesting to speculate that the invasive 
God of Burroughs is modeled upon what he comes to believe is his first 
traumatic experience of the adult world: his sexual abuse as a toddler by 
his nanny and her boyfriend. One could conclude that his early personal 
experience happens to coincide in some important ways with the wide-
spread psychic effects of the U.S. population during the decade or so after 
World War II as the multimedia assault upon people to change them into 
consumers so that they then will buy, buy, buy kicks into high gear.
 However this may be, there are clearly differences between the lit-
erary vision of Burroughs and the paranoid fantasies of Schreber, not 
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least the formal intentional differences between literature and madness. 
But the vision of god—whether explicitly owned up to or not, or ratio-
nally argued for via geometric models and analogies à la Spinoza, or 
enthusiastically embraced via drugs and debauchery à la Burroughs—
does express the norm of maximal energy or power that the subject 
can enjoy. The god of the subject is, of course, the superego writ large; 
and, in the case of the representative artist of a culture, assuming that 
there still may be such creatures, it also coincides at most points with 
the cultural superego. That we live now in an age of polytheism may be 
no improvement, however, on the theory that more means a dispersal 
of intensity; for it may just mean we have many more raging madnesses 
to evade than ever before.
 Intuition is usually thought to be a non-rational mode of knowledge, 
if it is thought to be knowledge at all. For Spinoza, there is nothing 
non-rational about it. Rather, it is the mind’s immediate perception 
of a principle of formation at work, like that (as we have seen) of the 
generation of a circle of a certain size from the specific dimensions of 
a right angle to be inscribed within it that produces its chords. This 
geometrical or axiomatic knowledge is Spinoza’s favorite instance of 
the universal knowledge of how rules of combination and differentia-
tion create forms of thinking and acting upon the world. It is intuitive 
knowledge of the mind at work. It is the mind’s loving self-imagination 
in the moment of creation.4 Burroughs’s fascination with Sufism can be 
seen in this light.
 Similarly, Burroughs’s routines, begun to make and keep in contact 
with prospective beloveds (among others), evolve into techniques of dis-
covery, both of the self and of its more general models of humanity, and 
so in this way at least instances the intellectual love of god, to put the 
matter in Spinoza’s terms. For the self-loathing queer junky Burroughs, 
whose routine of playing William Tell with his wife led to her death, such 
a sublimated use for the routine demonstrates how becoming a writer of 
routines saved him, not to mention others, perhaps. But the cost of this 
intuitive or imaginative knowledge of the mind at work can be, as it is for 
Burroughs, great.
 “Interzone,” an article originally written for The New Yorker (it was 
never accepted), suggests as much in its characterization of Brinton, an 
American living in Tangier before full Moroccan independence in the 
mid-1950s who is, like William Lee, an ironic version of Burroughs:
54 | Chapter 4
Some of these men have ability and intelligence, like Brinton, who writes 
unpublishably obscene novels and exists on a small income. He undoubt-
edly has talent, but his work is hopelessly unsalable. He has intelligence, 
the rare ability to see relations between disparate factors, to coordinate 
data, but he moves through life like a phantom, never able to find the 
time, place or person to put anything into effect, to realize any project 
in terms of three-dimensional reality. He could have been a successful 
business executive, anthropologist, explorer, criminal, but the conjunc-
ture of circumstances was never there. He is always too late or too early. 
His abilities remain larval, discarnate. He is the last of an archaic line, or 
the first here from another space-time way—in any case a man without 
context, of no place and no time. (50)
Some of this is self-serving, of course, which is why Burroughs assigns 
it to his new mask Brinton, not even giving it to Lee, who is too recog-
nizably himself. But there is also real insight here. Burroughs, like the 
modern or post-romantic writer or artists generally, suffers from irony 
as a condition of death-in-life. Abstracted and alienated from his actual 
historical position in space-time, the modern artist like Burroughs is 
a principle of possibility, too early or too late, without context, of no 
place and no time. Why? Because he can see the full development of 
a thing, a career, a way of life, and so can never be fully in it. Which 
is what makes him like the last of a kind or the first of a new alien 
breed. The modern artist, like Burroughs, is a caesura, a hiatus, more 
than anything else, a hole in reality. Like the figure in Naked Lunch of 
the Buyer (a narc who needs the junk he buys to make his busts), or 
like the junk itself in this text when personified as driven living capital, 
Burroughs as ironic modern artist is most of all “a creature without 
species” (17), and thus, in his art, the visionary perception incarnate 
of the principle of species-making. The intuitive knowledge of all that 
he lacks by way of determinant formation gives Burroughs then access 
to the actual templates of being—which is why he can play comic, 
pornographic, nihilistic, and unspeakable variations on the normal or 
proper—but also lyrical—paeans to love.
 The centerpiece of Naked Lunch and what many critics refer to as its 
Bataillean “general” or “anal” economy is of course “the talking asshole 
routine” (110–13). Originally the tail end of a letter to Ginsberg, meant to 
amuse and entice him, in revised form it ends up in the “Ordinary Men 
Visionar y Contact in the Interzone | 55
and Women” chapter of the novel. Drs. Schafer and Benway—the latter 
Burroughs’s spokesman for modern medicine gone wild in its experimen-
tation and drive to help control the population—are discussing absurd 
ways to surgically remake the human body to make it more efficient in 
its functioning—recreating form to perfect its function: “Why not one 
all-purpose blob?” (110). Benway suddenly recalls the story of “the man 
who taught his asshole to talk” (110).
This ass talk had a sort of gut frequency. It hit you right down there 
like you gotta go. You know when the old colon gives you the elbow 
and it feels sorta cold inside, and you know all you have to do is turn 
loose? Well this talking hit you right down there, a bubbly, thick stagnant 
sound, a sound you could smell. (110–11)
Benway goes on to explain that the man worked for a carnival and treated 
his talking asshole as part of a novelty ventriloquist act, which fits nicely 
with the passage above, as ventriloquism is originally a religious practice 
in ancient Greece called gastromancy, or “speaking from the stomach,” or 
in this case, the colon!
 The act at this point sounds most like minstrel show routines, such as
“Oh, I say, are you still down there, old thing?”
 “Nah! I had to go relieve myself.” (111)
But then the asshole starts talking on its own, ad-libbing and tossing back 
gags at the straight-man ventriloquist every time. It gets worse, Benway 
says, when the asshole develops teeth-like “little raspy incurving hooks” 
and starts eating. At first the man thinks this is cute and funny, but then 
the asshole begins to eat its way through his pants, exposing him in 
public, shouting on the street that it wants “equal rights” (111), getting 
drunk and having crying jags, saying “nobody loved it” and all it wanted 
is to be kissed “same as any other mouth” (111). Finally, the asshole talks 
“all the time day and night,” with the man shouting for it to shut up, 
beating it with his fist, “sticking candles up it” (to curse the darkness, I 
guess). Then one day the asshole says to him, ‘“It’s you who will shut up 
in the end. Not me. Because we don’t need you around here any more. I 
can talk and eat and shit”’ (111).
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After that [the man] began waking up in the morning with a transparent 
jelly like a tadpole’s tail all over his mouth. This jelly was what the scientists 
call un-D.T., Undifferentiated Tissue, which can grow into any kind of 
flesh on the human body. He would tear it off his mouth and the pieces 
would stick to his hands like burning gasoline jelly and grow there, grow 
anywhere on him a glob of it fell. So finally his mouth sealed over, and the 
whole head would have amputated spontaneous—(did you know there is 
a condition occurs in parts of Africa and only among Negroes where the 
little toe amputates spontaneously?)—except for the eyes, you dig. That’s 
one thing the asshole couldn’t do was see. It needed the eyes. But nerve con-
nections were blocked and infiltrated and atrophied so the brain couldn’t 
give orders any more. It was trapped in the skull, sealed off. For a while you 
could see the silent, helpless suffering of the brain behind the eyes, then 
finally the brain must have died, because the eyes went out, and there was 
no more feeling in them than a crab’s eye on the end of a stalk. (111–12)
Dr. Benway’s mad tale has the routine coming full circle, now reaching 
the point of intersection with Dr. Schafer’s original demonic parody of 
a visionary proposal to alter the inefficient human body into something 
resembling a giant eel: “Instead of a mouth and an anus to get out of 
order why not have a one all-purpose hole to eat and eliminate? We could 
seal up nose and mouth, fill in the stomach, make an air hole direct into 
the lungs where it should have been in the first place  .  .  .” (110). But the 
routine continues, not closing, but opening up to three new themes: 1) 
how sex leaks out of even the least sexy of our communications; 2) how 
modern democracy is really a fatal virus of bureaucracy, a deadly parasite 
in the body politic; and 3) finally, on a lighter note, as it were, how love 
perhaps does conquer even the asshole in us all.
 Oliver Harris has shown that the first of these new themes, how sex 
leaks out of every pore in the body of communication, is originally in 
the letter where this routine is hatched. In that epistolary context, it is in 
the first, not one of the final, positions. It all fits better there. But in this 
novelistic context, one wonders how sex leaking out of even the least of 
our communications, squeezing pass the censor bureaus, quite works—I 
mean, beyond the very general and obvious sense that the routine deals 
with the body and does end with a surreal scene of anal sex. As a refer-
ence to the passage about the Undifferentiated Tissue, it is not clear how 
it works, at first.
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 I think what Burroughs means, however, goes beyond any general and 
obvious points. His story about the asshole that talks, wants equal rights, 
is subject to drunken crying jags when neglected, develops vicious teeth 
in a parody of the vagina dentata, is his version of Milton’s and the Bible’s 
creation of Eve, adjusted for either straight or queer application. Instead 
of the feminine being born of the rib of the masculine, it is born of the 
anus.
 Similarly, the idea of modern democracy as a deadly parasite, a fatal 
virus like a cancer of bureaucracy, is Burroughs’s revision of the myth 
of modern democracy as a direct descendant of the Athenian political 
system. Rather, because of the censorship of sex, especially in its homo-
erotic forms, modern bureaucratic democracy, especially in its drive for 
mastery and control of the population, represents the end of the human 
species as we have known it—hence, the sci-fi degeneration and devolu-
tion where one might have expected or hoped for mutation to the next 
rung on the evolutionary ladder. The homosocial dimension of modern 
democracy, long recognized but also usually repressed except in certain 
rare instances, such as that of Whitman’s poetry, gives rise in the context 
of the repression of the 1950s to the nightmare scenarios in the novel, as 
well as in the culture at large. The final new theme, of comical but also 
quite loving, sexuality, in this instance appropriately homoerotic and anal, 
is the necessary sign from Burroughs’s Ugly Spirit for the Gentle Reader 
to pay heed, as Blake says in Milton, to mark his words as they are of our 
eternal salvation. Burroughs in Naked Lunch revises—satirically, parodi-
cally, and creatively (I will argue)—the Judeo-Christian and classical cul-
tural legacies of the Western tradition.
 Burroughs, however, is also a legatee of that tradition’s most virulent 
“diseases” of misogyny and misanthropy, with strong taints of racism and 
Orientalism, and even (especially given the historic immediacy of the 
Holocaust) anti-Semitism. Burroughs ironically puts everything into the 
mouths of characters or the author-surrogates in the novel, and hence 
much of what passes his lips in these crazed routines remains open to 
considerable debate. To put it another way, as the self-appointed Anus of 
the Western World (Joyce was only Ireland’s), we know that in reading 
Burroughs we are going to get dirty, to say the least. This abjection of the 
reader is of course a large part of his authorial intention, especially in 
Naked Lunch. The first time I read an excerpt from it in Evergreen Review 
a half century ago, I gagged and buried the magazine in an old wooden 
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chest my father had made for his gear when in the Navy during World 
War II. It had been turned into a toy chest and then was the depository 
for old magazines. At age twelve this reader’s sensibility felt ravaged. But 
this is the point I now realize. More than a deal with the devil, more than 
a pedophile’s love-letter to his lost love(s), Naked Lunch is that rare thing, 
a book that probably is really obscene, filled with what Burroughs calls 
“the Ugly Spirit” hunting down to destroy the last vestiges of innocence 
in any “Gentle Reader” who falls into the traps of its demonic routines. 
Force the American Readers to face the worst of what their existences 
presume everyday as preconditions. As the cherry on top of this heap of 
messy word-salad sundaes, add the self-loathing expressions of a junky 
queer from the U.S. heartland (in every sense), who finds every vicious 
underground from around the miserable world of the 1950s. And as rad-
ical cure for maniacal consumerism, Naked Lunch’s imaginary dripping 
fork in pure waste has now virtually global reach: “The title means exactly 
what the words say: NAKED Lunch—a frozen moment when everyone 
sees what is on the end of every fork” (199).
 Benway’s conclusion to the “Talking Asshole” routine may at first con-
tinue in the same hard-edged, cynically brutal vein, but it suddenly ends 
with a new tone and perspective:
In Timbuktu I once saw an Arab boy who could play a flute with his ass, 
and the fairies told me he was really an individual in bed. He could play a 
tune up and down the organ hitting the most exogenously sensitive spots, 
which are different on everyone, of course. Every lover had his special 
theme song which was perfect for him and rose to his climax. The boy 
was a great artist when it came to improvising new combines and special 
climaxes, some of them notes in the unknown, tie-ups and seeming dis-
cords that would suddenly break through each other and crash together 
with a stunning, hot sweet impact. (113)
Underneath all the obvious crudity in this passage, Benway reports on 
an imaginative perception about the nature of virtuosity in love-making 
(taken from “fairies”). This sharp intuition rises to a plausible generaliza-
tion about the rare genius in the art of love. It is perhaps based upon 
Burroughs’s own experiences in Tangier or Mexico, and so he identifies 
himself as in this flaming group of gay men. It also says something per-
tinent about the visionary writer’s individualizing designs of aesthetic 
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enjoyment. They are palpable upon the reader’s body, but in an interpen-
etrative spirit, as is any other more recognizable form of jouissance. In 
other words, Benway is channeling Burroughs here, even as Burroughs 
may be channeling, at least for this masterfully comic vision of love at 
play, the transfigured memory of his own boy-lover Kiki. The Ugly Spirit 
and the Gentle Reader are, momentarily, reconciled.
 How are we to understand this admittedly brief and unexpected vision 
of reconciliation in a novel that is perhaps the most indigestible of all? I 
think Spinoza’s theory of conatus and its relation to the intellectual love of 
God may help us to understand Burroughs, as strange as that may sound.
 “Conatus” is the term that Spinoza calls the activity of any being 
directed to its continuation in existence as the being it is. This activity 
in itself gives pleasure. Conatus is neither desire nor will, unless one sees 
it as a pleasuring or a willing that is in fact an acting to ensure a being’s 
existence as such. “The highest conatus of the mind,” Spinoza says, and 
the mind is the idea of the body that the body has of itself, and the mind’s 
“highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge” 
(154). That is, not by sensuous perception, nor by rational understanding, 
but by intuition. From this third kind of knowledge or intuition, the mind 
learns the intellectual love of God, which is Spinoza’s end-all and be-all, as 
it defines the ultimate conatus of existence, of being rather than nothing.
The mind’s intellectual love toward God is the love of God wherewith 
God loves himself not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be 
explicated [in his attributes and their modes] through the essence of the 
human mind considered under a form of eternity. That is, the mind’s 
intellectual love toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God 
loves himself. (157)
Each region of being constitutes a divine attribute, of which we know two, 
the res cognitans and res extenza, the thinking thing and the extended 
thing, subject and object. The modes of these attributes are as many and 
different as there are entities in existence. The intellectual love of God is 
“of ” him in two senses, then: both the love we feel toward God and the 
love God feels toward us and all that exists, that expresses its conatus. 
This view has gotten Spinoza accused of being a pantheist and notori-
ously excommunicated from the Jewish faith, as it would no doubt appall 
any monotheistic religionist, despite its being a rather curious pantheism: 
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there is one God, interchangeable with the Nature of modern science; that 
is, with the universe of matter and its laws. In any event, Spinoza’s Ethics 
may well express the visionary’s highest sense of virtue, which is why I 
find it useful in this context.
 In conclusion, I would recall these programmatic words from “Islam 
Incorporated and the Parties of the Interzone,” where there is a naked 
lunch menu printed out for the reader to assimilate. Without getting into 
the niceties of these different Interzone parties, the one Burroughs favors, 
the Factualists, has as its platform, in part, the following rejection of the 
use of telepathy, which was being investigated seriously at the time by 
U.S. and Soviet Union intelligence agencies for its potential mind-control 
power over its respective populations (at least):
We oppose, as we oppose atomic war, the use of such knowledge to 
control, coerce, debase, exploit or annihilate the individuality of another 
living creature. Telepathy is not, by its nature, a one-way process. To 
attempt to set up a one-way telepathic broadcast must be regarded as an 
unqualified evil. . . . (140)
What Burroughs calls “The Human Virus” (141) is the coercive use of 
knowledge, as opposed to its free intellectual pursuit. The “Deteriorated 
Image” of the human species, the “broken image of Man moves in minute 
by minute and cell by cell,” (141), like cancer, or junk, or self-loathing. 
But “The Human Virus can be isolated and treated” (141).
 How? through God’s love, of course:
Gentle reader, we see God through our assholes in the flash bulb of 
orgasm . . . Through these orifices transmute your body . . . The way OUT 
is the way IN . . . . (191)
Thus saith the Divine Asshole? More “notes in the unknown” (113).
 No wonder, then, that the creatively disjunctive discourses of Bur-
roughs’s genius-work of visionary imagination transforms with exuberant 
laughter the actual architecture and urban design of Tangier’s central 
district into a cubist collage depicting the modern inferno as a gigantic 
Dadaist toilet bowl especially equipped with the monstrous sounds of 
infinite suction. An American Standard: Beat-Style, Beat-State.
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Chapter 2
 1. All citations from the English version will be to Thomas Mann, Doctor 
Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverrkuhn As Told by a Friend, 
trans. John E. Woods (New York: Vintage, 1997) and hereafter given in the text.
 2. I am, of course, referring to Fredric Jameson, but also to Alan Wilde and 
William V. Spanos, among others. For an interesting but opposing view on the 
oppositions in the novel, see Jameson, “Allegory and History: Rereading Doctor 
Faustus,” The Modernist Papers (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 91–123.
 3. R.  P. Blackmur, Eleven Essays in the European Novel (New York: Har-
court, Brace & World, Inc., 1964). The chapter on Faustus is entitled suggestively 
“Parody and Critique.”
 4. Thomas Mann, The Story of a Novel: The Genesis of Doctor Faustus, trans. 
Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Knopf, 1961); Thomas Mann, Reflec-
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tions of a Non-Political Man, trans. Walter D. Norris (New York: Fredrick Ungar, 
1983), chapter 4.
 5. See my Radical Parody: American Culture and Critical Agency after Fou-
cault (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), for further discussion of this 
topic.
 6. Edward W. Said, Musical Elaborations (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991).
 7. For an essential basic understanding of Western music, see J. Peter Burk-
holder et al., eds., A History of Western Music, 8th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2010); Piero Weiss and Richard Taruskin, Music in the Western World: A History 
in Documents, 2nd ed., selected and annotated by Weiss and Taruskin (Belmont, 
CA: Schirmer Cengage Learning, 2008). For Schoenberg, see Arnold Schoenberg, 
Theory of Harmony, trans. Roy E. Carter (Berkeley and Los Angles: University 
of California Press, 1983). For the new music of the last century, see Theodore 
W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. 
Blomster (New York and London: Continuum, 2004).
 8. For the German edition, see Thomas Mann, Doktor Faustus (Frankford 
am Main, Germany: S. Fischer Verlag, 2007). All citations to the German edition 
will be from this text. For the industrious, there is a supplementary volume of 
over 1,000 pages of critical annotations.
 9. For Death in Venice, see Thomas Mann, Stories of Three Decades, trans. 
H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Knopf, 1936). Citations are from this text. There 
are other, new translations, but none yet by John E. Woods, the preferred English 
translator by far. Here is one of the most recent ones: Thomas Mann, Death in 
Venice, trans Michael Henry Heim, introduction by Michael Cunningham (New 
York: Harper/Collins, 2004).
 10. The question of the novel’s narrator is a greatly disputed matter. For sum-
mary judgments of these debates and all others associated with Doctor Faustus, 
see Michael Beddow, Landmarks of World Literature: Thomas Mann, Doctor 
Faustus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John F. Fetzer, Changing 
Perceptions of Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus: Criticism 1947–1992 (Columbia, 
SC: Camden House, 1996); Frances Lee, Overturning Doctor Faustus: Rereading 
Thomas Mann’s Novel in Light of Observations of a Non-Political Man (Rochester, 
NY: Boydell and Brewer, 2007).
 11. Thomas Mann, “Freud and the Future,” in his Essays of Three Decades, 
trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Knopf, 1947), pp. 411–28. All citations are 
from this translation. For an excellent contemporary development of the uto-
pian hopes for psychoanalysis in a more tragic humanistic vein, see Abraham 
Drassinower, Freud’s Theory of Culture: Eros, Loss, and Politics (Lanham and New 
York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003. Of course, Freud’s theory of the death-instinct 
or drive is that an individual and a society can develop via the formation of a 
conscience as a pure culture of the death-instinct. What explanatory power such 
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 12. See Paul A. Bove, “Misprisions of Utopia: Messianism, Modernism, and 
Allegory,” in a Preface to Henry Adams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
 13. See Bove, “Misprisions.” 
 14. http://dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/collins
 15. Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: The 
Modern Library, 1948), 306.
 16. See Lee’s and Fetzer’s books cited above.
 17. As to the question of the Diaries clearing things up, given their edited 
form in English at least, they are unlikely to settle anything. See Thomas Mann, 
Diaries, 1918–1939, selection and foreword by Hermann Kesten, translated by 
Richard and Clara Winston (London: Robin Clark, 1984). The two latest biog-
raphies in English are more helpful but still not definitive on this question. See 
Anthony Heilbut, Thomas Mann: Eros and Literature (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1995); Hermann Kurzke, Thomas Mann: Life as a 
Work of Art, trans. Leslie Wilson (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2002).
 18. I want to thank Gina MacKenzie, Michelle Martin, and Alan Singer 
for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. I have been especially 
helped by Ms. Martin’s comments and by her work on the modern novel and 
Georges Bataille’s theory of “the accursed share.”
Chapter 3
 1. Vladimir Nabokov, The Annotated Lolita, revised and updated, ed. Alfred 
Appel, Jr. (New York: Vintage, 1991), p. 9. Hereafter all citations from this edition 
will be given in the text.
 2. The Nabokov industry contributes mightily to this perception of their 
author, but it has also been wonderfully helpful. What follows are the list of 
books and articles most helpful to me: 
Books: Vladimir E. Alexandrov, Nabokov’s Otherworld (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1991); Brian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The Russian Years (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Brian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The 
American Years (New York: Vintage, 1991); Julian W. Connolly, ed, The Cam-
bridge Companion to Nabokov (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
(especially useful in these books are the essays by Brian Boyd, John Burt Foster, 
Jr., Ellen Pifer, and Susan Elizabeth Sweeney); Julian W. Connolly, ed., A Reader’s 
Guide to Lolita (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2009); Jane Grayson, Arnold 
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McMillin, and Priscilla Meyer, Nabokov’s World, Vol. 1: The Shape of Nabokov’s 
World (New York: Palgrave, 2002) and Nabokov’s World, Vol. 2: Reading Nabokov 
(New York: Palgrave, 2002); Ellen Pifer, ed., Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita: A Case-
book (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) (Especially useful in these books 
are the essays by Rachel Bowlby, John Haegert, Thomas R. Frosch, and Ellen 
Pifer); Michael Wood, The Magician’s Doubts: Nabokov and the Risks of Fiction 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
Articles: Alfred Appel, Jr., “Lolita: The Springboard of Parody,” Wisconsin Studies 
in Contemporary Literature 8.2: A Special Number Devoted to Vladimir Nabokov 
(Spring 1967): 204–41; Alfred Appel, Jr., “The Road to Lolita, or the Ameri-
canization of an Emigre,” JML 4.1 (September 1974): 3–31; Brian Boyd, “‘Even 
Homais Nods’: Nabokov’s Fallibility, or, How to Revise Lolita,” Nabokov Studies 
4 (1995): 1–28; Dana Brand, “The Interaction of Aestheticism and American 
Consumer Culture in Nabokov’s Lolita,” Modern Language Studies 17.2 (Spring 
1987): 14–21; Maurice Couturier, “Narcissism and Demand in Lolita,” Nabokov 
Studies 9 (2005): 13–34; Paul Giles, “Lolita, Pornography, and the Perversions of 
American Studies,” Journal of American Studies 34.11 (April 2000): 41–66; Eric 
Goldman, “‘Knowing’ Lolita: Sexual Deviance and Normality in Nabokov’s Lolita,” 
Nabokov Studies 8 (2004): 23–39; Arthur R. Moore, “How Unreliable is Hum-
bert in Lolita?” JML 25.1 (Autumn 2001): 71–80; Lance Olsen, “A Janus-Faced 
Text: Realism, Fantasy, and Nabokov’s Lolita,” MFS 32.1 (Spring 1986): 115–25; 
James Phelan, “Estranging Unreliability, Bonding Unreliability, and the Ethics 
of Lolita,” Narrative 15.2 (May 2007): 3–23; Eric Rothstein, “Lolita: Nymphet at 
Normal School,” Contemporary Literature 41.1 (Spring 2000): 22–55; Alan Singer, 
“Reasonable Imaginings: Learning from Imagination,” Symploke 16.1–2 (2008): 
227–40; J. B. Sisson, “Nabokov’s Cosmic Synchronization and ‘Something Else,’” 
Nabokov Studies 1 (1994): 113–34; Nomi Tamir-Ghez, “The Art of Persuasion in 
Nabokov’s Lolita,” Poetics Today 1.1–2 (1979): 73–90; Frederick S. Whiting, “‘The 
Strange Particularity of the Lover’s Preference’: Pedophilia, Pornography, and the 
Anatomy of Monstrosity in Lolita,” American Literature 70.4 (December 1998): 
833–62; Michael Wood, “Lolita Revisited,” New England Review 17.33 (Summer 
1995): 15–43. I agree generally with Wood’s controversial view that “Humbert’s 
showy self-consciousness, I think, adds up to something less than skepticism: he 
really is saying what he pretends he is only pretending to say” (28).
 3. See my Lionel Trilling: The Work of Liberation (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1988).
 4. Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on Don Quixote, ed. Fredson Bowers; fore-
word by Guy Davenport (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1983), p. 1: “A 
masterpiece of fiction is an original world and as such is not likely to fit the world 
of the reader.” Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on Literature, ed. Fredson Bowers; 
introduction by John Updike (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1980), p.1: 
“We should always remember that the work of art is invariably the creation of 
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a new world, so that the first thing we should do is to study that new world as 
closely as possible, approaching it as something brand new, having no obvious 
connection with the worlds we already know.” The other texts by Nabokov cited 
in this essay are Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited (New York: Vintage, 
1967); and Strong Opinions (New York: Vintage, 1990).
 5. See, for just two examples, Philippe Lacoue-Labarth and Jean-Luc Nancy, 
The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism (Bing-
hamton: SUNY Press, 1988); and Pierre Bourdieu, The Rule of Art: Genesis and 
Structure of the Literary Field (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
 6. For a discussion of this topic, see my The Romance of Interpretation: 
Visionary Criticism from Pater to De Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985).
 7. See Christopher Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical 
Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
 8. Michael L. Morgan, ed., The Essential Spinoza: Ethics and Related Writ-
ings, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2006). All citations 
to this edition will be given hereafter in my text. For a clarifying if at points 
problematic essay on intuition in Spinoza, see Syliane Malinowski-Charles, “The 
Circle of Adequate Knowledge,” Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Vol. 
1, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), pp. 139–63. This commentator argues that traditional views of intuition in 
Spinoza, especially in Anglo-American and French contexts, have only recently 
been properly corrected. Malinowski-Charles claims that intuition, the third kind 
of knowledge like God’s, is based in reason, and the second kind, even as it and 
reason are separated from the first kind, knowledge of the senses is determined 
by the imagination. I agree that intuition is knowledge of the essence of a partic-
ular thing, but it is also knowledge of the whole in the light of eternity, that is, of 
the processes of being in all their phases in an instant of time: God’s knowledge. 
This intellectual intuition is like neither the sensuous imagination nor the calcu-
lating reason, but instead it is indeed a distinctly third kind of knowledge, that of 
being in all its phases, like the summary-histories of sub-atomic particulars that 
the mathematical formulas of quantum physics make possible to envision. This 
is why Spinoza sometimes speaks of intuition as being knowledge of the mind 
of God. Given that this mind is infinite, for a finite being to have such potent 
knowledge, even for an instant, is surely a risky proposition, as well as what Spi-
noza stressed, that accession to power that a divine joy.
 9. See explained Nabokov’s similar idea, “the springboard of parody,” in the 
article by that title by Appel listed in note 2. For my discussion of Nietzsche on 
this topic, see my The Art of Reading as a Way of Life: On Nietzsche’s Truth (Evan-
ston: Northwestern University Press, 2009).
 10. See my The Art of Reading as a Way of Life: On Nietzsche’s Truth.
 11. For a discussion of this topic, see my Visions of Global America and the 
Notes to Chapter 4 | 67
Future of Critical Reading (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2009).
 12. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see my Lionel Trilling: The Work of 
Liberation cited previously.
Chapter 4
 1. William S. Burroughs, Naked Lunch: 50th Anniversary Edition, The 
Restored Text, ed. James Grauerholz and Barry Miles (New York: Grove Press, 
2009). The other Burroughs texts used for this essay are as follows: The Adding 
Machine: Selected Essays (New York: Arcade, 1993); Early Routines (Santa Bar-
bara, CA: Cadmus Editions, 1981); Everything Lost: The Latin American Note-
book of William S. Burroughs, ed. Oliver Harris (Columbus: The Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, 2008); Exterminator (New York: Penguin Books, 1979); Interzone, 
ed. James Grauerholz (New York: Penguin Books, 1989); Junky: 50th Anniver-
sary Edition , ed. Oliver Harris (New York: Penguin Books, 2003); The Letters of 
William S. Burroughs, 1945–1959, ed. Oliver Harris (New York: Penguin Books, 
1993); Queer (New York: Penguin Books, 1987); The Yage Letters Redux, ed. 
Oliver Harris (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2006). The Yage letters are the 
letters between Burroughs and Ginsberg on the topic of the former’s quest for 
“the ultimate fix” via heroin.
 2. The books that have been most helpful are Phil Baker, William S. Bur-
roughs: Critical Lives (London: Reaktion Books, 2010); Brian T. Edwards, 
Morocco Bound: Disorienting America’s Maghreb, From Casablanca to The Mar-
rakech Express (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005); Dennis A. 
Foster: Sublime Enjoyment: On the Perverse Motive in American Literature (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Oliver Harris, William Burroughs and 
the Secret of Fascination (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003); 
Oliver Harris and Ian MacFadden, eds., Naked Lunch @ 50: Anniversary Essays 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009); Barry Miles, William Bur-
roughs: El Hombre Invisible, A Portrait (New York: Hyperion, 1992); Ted Morgan, 
Literary Outlaw: The Life and Times of William S. Burroughs (New York: Avon 
Books, 1990); Timothy S. Murphy, Wising Up the Marks: The Amodern William 
Burroughs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Davis Schneiderman 
and Philip Walsh, eds., Retaking the Universe: William S. Burroughs in the Age of 
Globalization (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Rob Wilson, Beat Attitudes: On the 
Roads to Beatitude for Post-Beat Writers, Dharma Bums, and Cultural-Political 
Activists (San Francisco: New Pacific Press, 2010).
 3. See, among other essays, Douglas G. Baldwin, ‘“Word Begets Image and 
Image Is Virus’: Undermining Language and Film in the Works of William S. 
Burroughs,” College Literature 27.1 (Winter 2000): 63–83; Kathryn Hume, “Wil-
liam Burroughs’s Phantasmic Geography,” Contemporary Literature 40.1 (Spring 
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1999): 111–35; Allan Johnston, “Consumption, Addiction, Vision, Energy: Polit-
ical Economies and Utopian Visions in the Writings of the Beat Generation,” 
College Literature 32.2 (Spring 2005): 103–26; Robin Lydenberg, “Notes from the 
Orifice: Language and the Body in William Burroughs,” Contemporary Litera-
ture 26.1 (Spring 1985): 55–73; Fiona Paton, “Monstrous Rhetoric: Naked Lunch, 
National Security, and the Gothic Fifties,” Texas Studies in Literature and Lan-
guage 52.1 (Spring 2010): 48–69; Wayne Pounds, “The Postmodern Anus: Parody 
and Utopia in Two Recent Novels by William S. Burroughs,” Poetics Today 8.3–4 
(1987): 611–29; Frederick S. Whiting, “Monstrosity on Trial: The Case of Naked 
Lunch,” Twentieth Century Literature 52.2 (Summer 2006): 145–74.
 4. For Spinoza, see Rebecca Goldstein, Betraying Spinoza: The Renegade 
Jew Who Gave Us Modernity (New York: Schocken, 2006); John Leslie, Infi-
nite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology (New York: Oxford, 2003); Michael L. 
Morgan, ed., The Essential Spinoza: Ethics and Related Writings, trans. Samuel 
Shirley (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 2006). Leslie’s vision is 
remarkably akin to Gilles Deleuze’s in his works on Spinoza, but simply clearer 
for an English-speaking audience. My assumption here is that Burroughs, despite 
sounding like a latter-day Gnostic, especially in his later work, is an immanen-
tist and that his God is split but one, and one with Nature, rather than two, an 
evil and incompetent Demiurge and an Alien God beyond existence whose Son 
must somehow mediate between him and us. In short, like Spinoza, Burroughs’s 
God is the name for that highest state of energy that one may knowingly enjoy 
without dying or going mad for good. The coincidence via intuition between the 
finite human mind and the infinite mind of God is thus ever a risky but seduc-
tively dangerous proposition: knowledge thus is power and jouissance.
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